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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explains Swiss accession to collective security organizations by 
analyzing key domestic and international factors relating to Switzerland’s permanent 
neutrality. The study provides historical and theoretical background regarding the 
concepts of neutrality and collective security before examining the positive vote in the 
referendum for accession to the League of Nations in 1920, the consequent adoption of 
differential neutrality, and the return to traditional neutrality in 1938. The study then 
considers Switzerland’s refusal to join the United Nations (UN) in 1945, Swiss neutrality 
during the Cold War, the failed UN referendum in 1986, and Swiss accession to the UN 
after the successful referendum in 2002. The thesis concludes that international solidarity 
is an inherent part of Swiss neutrality in addition to its security function. These elements 
together constitute a flexible neutrality conception that is capable of contributing to 
collective security while enjoying the safety of traditional neutrality. Changes in the 
international system and the institutional character of Swiss politics have significantly 
influenced Swiss relations with collective security organizations. Neutrality will continue 
to be a major factor as long as the concept is linked to national identity and the idea of a 
Swiss “special role.” 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis compares two turning points in the history of Swiss neutrality and puts 
them into an analytical perspective. In 1920, Switzerland joined a collective security 
system, the League of Nations, and in 2002, another type of collective security 
arrangement, the United Nations (UN). In theory, collective security is incompatible with 
neutrality because aggressive war is illegal, and all members of the collective security 
system should take action against the aggressor. From this perspective, neutrality is 
obsolete, impossible and immoral. In practice, however, neutrality and collective security 
have coexisted. Some states, including Switzerland, have maintained a status that might 
be called “differential” neutrality. 
This leads to the major research question: Which domestic and international 
factors help to explain Swiss accession to collective security organizations such as the 
League of Nations and the UN, and how have these factors influenced the theory and 
practice of Switzerland’s permanent neutrality? 
Five subquestions focus and structure the comparison of the case studies, Swiss 
neutrality in the interwar League and in the post-Cold War UN. To what extent was the 
neutrality debate a decisive factor in the outcome of the referendums on membership in 
these organizations?1 How were the three functions of neutrality—security, solidarity and 
identity—addressed in the referendum campaigns? Which international developments, 
such as external threats and growing political and economic interdependence, led to the 
referendums? How were those external factors addressed in the referendum discussions? 
How was “differential” neutrality officially defined and how was it put into practice 
during crises? 
                                                 
1 The Swiss political system of “direct democracy” requires a public referendum before the federation 
can join a supranational organization or an organization of collective security (mandatory since 1977). A 
dual majority of people votes and cantons is required. For a good introduction to the Swiss political system 
see Laurent Goetschel, Magdalena Bernath and Daniel Schwarz, Swiss Foreign Policy : Foundations and 
Possibilities (New York: Routledge, 2005). 
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B. IMPORTANCE  
For more than ninety years, foreign political leaders and the academic literature 
have repeatedly declared the death of neutrality in Switzerland for multiple reasons. It is 
striking how similar the arguments of 1919 are to those of today.2 
In contrast, the Swiss people have firmly supported the concept of permanent 
neutrality since the country formally adopted this policy in 1815.3 Switzerland is, 
therefore, an ideal case to test the continuing relevance of a neutrality policy in long-term 
historical perspective. A comparison of its behavior in the interwar period and the post-
Cold War period can put historical analogies and differences in sharp perspective. 
Swiss neutrality is often seen as an inflexible and backward-oriented paradigm. It 
is reduced to its rigid security function and its military core. This thesis challenges this 
view. It investigates the hypothesis that international solidarity is an equally important 
part of the neutrality concept that should not be treated separately from its national 
security function for Switzerland. Both elements together constitute a flexible neutrality 
conception, capable of contributing to collective security while enjoying the safety of 
traditional neutrality. 
The comparison of the referendum campaigns in 1920 and 2002 clarifies why it is 
impossible to explain Switzerland’s decision making exclusively in terms of changes in 
the balance of power system, the influence of governmental elites, or traditional identity 
norms of the population. In this sense, the thesis aims to contribute to a broader 
understanding of Swiss neutrality. 
                                                 
2 See, for example, in 1919, R. F. Roxburgh, “Changes in the Conception of Neutrality,” Journal of 
Comparative Legislation and International Law 1, no. 1 (1919): 17–24, http://www.jstor.org/stable/752715 
(accessed April 16, 2009); in 1936, Elbert D. Thomas, “Theory of Neutrality,” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 186 (July 1936): 163–168, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1020622 
(accessed January 23, 2009); in 2006, James D. Carafano, “The Death of Neutrality: U.S. and European 
Convergence in Fighting the War on Terrorism,” Heritage Lectures, no. 956 (2006), 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/upload/hl_956.pdf (accessed May 25, 2009). 
3 Although Switzerland has been neutral since the sixteenth century, its formal neutrality was 
recognized at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. 
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C. HYPOTHESES 
The study investigates the hypothesis that Switzerland joined the League and the 
UN to strengthen the solidarity pillar of its neutrality in conjunction with the decline of 
the security function of its neutral status, at a time when an external threat seemed remote 
and a functioning collective security organization appeared to be in prospect. However, 
neutrality has remained the most important tool to protect Swiss sovereignty and identity. 
“Differential” neutrality therefore does not represent a fundamental shift in public 
opinion or a renunciation of neutrality, but an institutionalization of a pragmatic and 
autonomous à la carte security and solidarity policy, which may survive as long as the 
sovereign state system often attributed to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia exists.4 
The hypotheses imply four main arguments and problems. First, Swiss neutrality 
is an instrument for participation in collective security and maintaining national security 
in relation to the European and world balance of power. The Swiss are well aware of the 
theoretical incompatibilities between neutrality and collective security. But, they have 
learned from history that neither academically remote theories nor the precepts of 
international law can guarantee their survival. This is the reason why the Swiss 
population does not see a contradiction between international solidarity and armed 
neutrality. The referendum campaigns and the character of the “differential” neutrality 
practiced by Switzerland in the League and the UN provide evidence for this. 
Second, Switzerland joined the League and the UN at times when the security 
function of neutrality appeared to be in relative decline. This work investigates the 
hypothesis that the absence of an external threat was the main trigger for the decline of 
the security function of neutrality and led, therefore, to the positive outcomes of the 
referendums. 
Third, Switzerland joined the League and the UN to express solidarity and thereby 
strengthen its neutrality and position in the international system. In other words, when the 
                                                 
4 For the à la carte terminology, see David S. Brackett, “International Relations à La Carte: A New 
Swiss Neutrality in Europe,” Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, WCFIA 
Working Paper 4 (1997), italics in the original, http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/ 
WCFIA_97-04.pdf (accessed January 23, 2009). 
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national security function of neutrality declines, the solidarity function increases. The 
analysis of the history of Switzerland’s differential neutrality in the League and UN 
reveals this mechanism. 
Fourth, Swiss neutrality is an expression of national identity and consequently, 
national sovereignty. The identity function of neutrality has gained importance over time. It is 
a fundamental part of national identity in addition to independence, federalism and direct 
democracy. This is why neutrality plays such an important role in national referendums on 
questions of statecraft and policy. 
There are two problems that remain challenging. First, why did Switzerland join the 
UN in 2002 and not earlier or later? Second, how exactly do the causal relations among 
international factors, elite behavior and interest groups influence the outcomes of public 
referendums? 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Neutrality has not been a “hot topic” of international relations research since the 
United States dropped the idea in World War II. The amount of scholarly work reflects the 
historical “ups and down” of the concept. For the purpose of this research, four strands of 
neutrality literature that address different elements and levels of the research question have 
been identified. 
First, most of the neutrality literature has been written by specialists in international 
law. They have focused on legal aspects of neutrality and have usually considered to what 
extent the law of neutrality, dating back to The Hague Conventions of 1907, is valid or 
compatible with more recent international legal conventions, such as the League’s Covenant, 
the UN Charter and the EU treaties. 
For the League5 and even more for the UN,6 there is agreement that neutrality is not 
compatible with collective security. However, most authors acknowledge that, if the 
                                                 
5 Malbone Watson Graham Jr., “The Effect of the League of Nations Covenant on the Theory and 
Practice of Neutrality,” California Law Review 15, no. 5 (July 1927): 357–377, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3475072 (accessed February 6, 2009). 
6 T. Komarnicki, “The Problem of Neutrality Under the United Nations Charter,” Transactions of the 
Grotius Society 38 (1952): 77–91, http://www.jstor.org/stable/743159 (accessed February 06, 2009); Alfred 
Verdross, “Austria's Permanent Neutrality and the United Nations Organization,” The American Journal of 
International Law 50, no. 1 (January 1956): 61–68, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2194585 (accessed 
February 6, 2009).  
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collective security system does not work as intended, there is still room for the law of 
neutrality. There is disagreement as to whether “differential” neutrality is legally 
possible. In addition, there is a general concern about the decline of international law 
since 2001.7 
A purely legalistic approach does not answer the research question. However, the 
international law literature shows two things. In the first place, neutrality has evolved 
from a legal problem to an element of strategic and political culture in Switzerland. 
Furthermore, Switzerland has significantly influenced international law to back up its 
flexible neutrality policy. 
Second, the findings of authors who take a theoretical or political approach 
towards neutrality are more useful for this study than the works of legal specialists. There 
is a huge amount of literature about international relations, collective security and small 
states. However, few authors have devoted considerable attention to neutrality.8 
Unfortunately, no “theory of neutrality” exists, and few authors have created a well 
structured explanatory framework for the malleable concept of neutrality. Most useful is 
the approach of Efraim Karsh, who makes some important observations supporting the 
main argument of this thesis.9 
Traditional neutrality implies a realist worldview, which is used in the classic 
literature.10 However, Gregory Raymond’s work shows how limited the practical value of 
realism can be. He makes the narrow and reductionist argument that only the distribution 
                                                 
7 Dimitrios Argirakos, Neutralität und Europäische Union im 21. Jahrhundert, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2005), 331. 
8 A good example is Martin Wight, “The Idea of Neutrality,” London Calling, October 11, 1956. 
9 Efraim Karsh, “International Co-Operation and Neutrality,” Journal of Peace Research 25, no. 1 
(March 1988): 57–67, http://www.jstor.org/stable/423981 (accessed April 16, 2009); Efraim Karsh, 
Neutrality and Small States (New York: Routledge, 1988), 225. 
10 Hans J. Morgenthau, “International Affairs: The Resurrection of Neutrality in Europe,” The 
American Political Science Review 33, no. 3 (June 1939): 473–486, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1948801 
(accessed April 16, 2009). For a comparison of different schools in international relations and their view of 
neutrality see Joseph Kruzel and Michael H. Haltzel, Between the Blocs: Problems and Prospects for 
Europe's Neutral and Nonaligned States (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars; Cambridge University Press, 1989), 298ff. 
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of military capabilities has an impact on neutrality.11 A growing group of authors sees 
important moral values and ideals in neutrality. The concept is presented as a kind of 
state pacifism and an alternative peaceful concept of security policy.12 Laurent Goetschel 
makes a detailed argument about how the international environment led to an idealistic 
neutrality policy based on solidarity.13 Karen Devine stands for the constructivist school 
and makes an important argument about how domestic norms influence foreign policy.14 
The boundaries between the idealist and constructivist approaches are blurred. However, 
both schools find reasons why neutrality should continue to exist. 
Third, other scholars have approached the subject from a country perspective. 
Although of minor value for this study, the question of EU membership and neutrality has 
been examined extensively in the scholarly literature. The main argument is that EU 
membership is not compatible with neutrality.15 However, analysis of the Irish case has 
offered some useful insights into how public opinion regarding neutrality may influence 
the outcome of a referendum.16 Another useful study has analyzed the Austrian EU  
 
 
                                                 
11 Gregory A. Raymond, “Neutrality Norms and the Balance of Power,” Cooperation and Conflict 32, 
no. 2 (June 1997): 123–146 (accessed April 20, 2009). 
12 For an example, see Thomas Roithner, “Neutralität und europäische Sicherheitspolitik. Die 
Militarisierung der Union, die Verfassung und die Chancen für eine europäische Zivilmacht,“ Politik und 
Zeitgeschehen 17 (2007): 36, http://www.voegb.at/bildungsangebote/skripten/pzg/PZG-17.pdf (accessed 
February 10, 2009). 
13 Laurent Goetschel, “Neutrality, a really Dead Concept?” Cooperation and Conflict 34, no. 2 (June 
1999): 115–139, http://cac.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/34/2/115 (accessed February 6, 2009). 
14 Karen Devine, “The Myth of ‘the Myth of Irish Neutrality’: Deconstructing Concepts of Irish 
Neutrality using International Relations Theories,” Irish Studies in International Affairs 17 (2006): 115–
139, http://www.ria.ie/cgi-bin/ria/papers/100572.pdf (accessed January 23, 2009). 
15 Stephan Nonhoff, In der Neutralität verhungern? (Münster: Agenda Verlag, 1995), 246; Surya P. 
Subedi, “Neutrality in a Changing World: European Neutral States and the European Community,” The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 42, no. 2 (April 1993): 238–268, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/761099 (accessed February 6, 2009). 
16 Roisin Doherty, Ireland, Neutrality and European Security Integration (Burlington: Ashgate Pub 
Ltd, 2002), 283. 
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referendums with a two-level game theory.17 In general, comparative studies of neutral 
countries are less helpful than analyses of specific cases, because Switzerland is often 
treated as a special case.18 
The literature about Switzerland reflects perfectly the general dilemma. Some 
recent works have declared neutrality dead, but at the same time they have not 
recommended abandoning the concept.19 An exception is Jürg Gabriel, who has collected 
many arguments for why Switzerland should radically change its foreign policy.20 He 
argues that UN membership is the first sign of a “changing political identity” and that a 
change at the system level has occurred.21 Jean-Marc Rickli provides a useful definition 
of neutrality and explains how the national security function has declined.22 Finally, 
                                                 
17 Although this approach may not serve for Switzerland, see Jeffrey S. Lantis and Matthew F. Queen, 
“Negotiating Neutrality: The Double-Edged Diplomacy of Austrian Accession to the European Union,” 
Cooperation and Conflict 33, no. 2 (June 1998): 152–182 (accessed April 16, 2009). 
18 Examples are Hanspeter Neuhold, The European Neutrals in the 1990s: New Challenges and 
Opportunities, Austrian Institute for International Affairs Series (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 279; 
Emily Munro, ed., Challenges to Neutral & Non-Aligned Countries in Europe and Beyond, (Geneva: 
Geneva Center for Security Policy, 2005), http://www.gcsp.ch/e/publications/Issues_Institutions/Europe/ 
Con_Proceedings/Neutrality%20Report.pdf (accessed February 07, 2009); Hanna Ojanen, ed., Neutrality 
and Non-Alignment in Europe Today, (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2003), 
http://www.upi-fiia.fi/assets/publications/UPI_Report_06_2003.pdf (accessed February 07, 2009). 
19 Alois Riklin, “Neutralität am Ende? 500 Jahre Neutralität der Schweiz,” Humboldt-Nachrichten, no. 
30 (2008): 13–22, http://www.humboldt.hu/HN30/HN30-13-22-
Neutralitaet_am_ende_500_Jahre_Neutralitaet_der_Schweiz.pdf (accessed October 17, 2009). 
20 Jürg Martin Gabriel, Swiss Neutrality and the “American Century”: Two Conflicting Worldviews, 
Beiträge 14 (Zürich: ETH, Forschungsstelle für Internationale Beziehungen, 1998), http://e-
collection.ethbib.ethz.ch/view/eth:22581 (accessed February 6, 2009).  
21 Jürg Martin Gabriel, Die Gegenläufigkeit von Neutralität und Humanitären Interventionen, Beiträge 
26 (Zürich: ETH, Forschungsstelle für Internationale Beziehungen, 1999), http://e-
collection.ethbib.ethz.ch/view/eth:23457 (accessed February 6, 2009); Jürg Martin Gabriel and Jon A. 
Fanzun, The Asymmetries of Swiss Foreign Policy, Beiträge 42 (Zürich: ETH, Forschungsstelle für 
Internationale Beziehungen, 2003), http://e-collection.ethbib.ethz.ch/view/eth:26298 (accessed February 6, 
2009). 
22 Jean-Marc Rickli, “Neutrality: From a Small State's Power Instrument to a Powerful Identity 
Provider” (unpublished Article, Oxford, 2008). Copy directly from the author. Quoted with the author’s 
permission.  
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Edgar Bonjour, Georg Kreis, and Daniel Möckli wrote influential historical studies about 
Swiss neutrality and the Swiss neutrality discourse.23 
Fourth, there is only a little literature directly analyzing the research question. The 
League period is often briefly cited to introduce the Swiss post-Cold War neutrality. Only 
Robert Brooks has evaluated the 1920 referendum.24 For the UN, more literature is 
available. William Rappard and Howard Taubenfeld have discussed some basic problems 
of UN membership and neutrality.25 Michael Gunter has pointed to the main problem of 
Swiss membership in the UN and the legacy of the League in an excellent article. In his 
view, set forth in 1976, if neutrality was compromised enough by collective security and 
the Federal Council was committed enough, then the population would probably join the 
UN.26 Ernst Enzelsberger also analyzed the situation in Switzerland before the UN 
referendum.27  
Carlo Moos has prepared the only structured comparison between the League and 
the UN referendums available.28 
 
                                                 
23 Edgar Bonjour, Geschichte der Schweizerischen Neutralität: Kurzfassung (Basel: Helbing & 
Lichtenhahn, 1978); Georg Kreis, Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart: Ein Inventar zum 
neutralitätspolitischen Diskurs in der Schweiz seit 1943 (Bern: Haupt, 2004); Daniel Möckli, Neutralität, 
Solidarität, Sonderfall: Die Konzeptionierung der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik der Nachkriegszeit, 1943–
1947, Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung 55 (Zürich: FSK ETH Zürich, 2000), 
336. 
24 Robert C. Brooks, “Swiss Referendum on the League of Nations,” The American Political Science 
Review 14, no. 3 (1920), 477–480, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1946268 (accessed April 16, 2009). 
25 Howard J. Taubenfeld, “International Actions and Neutrality,” The American Journal of 
International Law 47, no. 3 (1953): 377–396, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2194679 (accessed April 16, 
2009); William E. Rappard, “The United Nations and Switzerland,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 246, (1946): 64–71, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1025133 (accessed April 20, 
2009). 
26 Michael M. Gunter, “Switzerland and the United Nations,” International Organization 30, no. 1 
(Winter 1976): 129–152, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706251 (accessed February 6, 2009). 
27 Ernst F. Enzelsberger, “Die Schweiz und die UNO,” in Jahrbuch für internationale 
Sicherheitspolitik 2001, ed. Erich Reiter (Hamburg: Mittler & Sohn, 2001), 25–37, 
http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/03_jb01_50_enz.pdf (accessed April 25, 2009). 
28 Carlo Moos, Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO: Die Volksabstimmungen von 1920 und 1986 in 
der Schweiz (Zürich: Chronos, 2001), 231. 
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An important source for this thesis is the yearly Swiss “security” study that 
analyzes Swiss public opinion in detail. It also provides the analytical framework for the 
three neutrality functions mentioned—that is, national security, international solidarity 
and national identity.29 
E. METHODOLOGY  
The method used in this thesis is a focused and structured comparison.30 This 
method requires a well formulated analytical theory, and such a theory unfortunately does 
not exist for neutrality. However, the analysis is structured along specific issues 
concerning the independent variables outlined in the research questions. It is focused on 
four important events within two historical timeframes.   
The observed timeframes are the interwar League and the post-Cold War UN. The 
relevant events for Switzerland for the League were the successful referendum in 1920, 
when Switzerland joined the League and adopted a “differential” neutrality, and the 
return to traditional neutrality in 1938, when Switzerland ceased supporting League’s 
economic sanctions. For the UN, the important dates are the 1986 negative referendum 
result and the 2002 positive referendum outcome about accession to the organization. 
Furthermore, the thesis briefly investigates the practice of “differential” neutrality from 
1920 to 1938 and the reasons for Switzerland’s refusal to join the UN in 1946.  
This thesis does not rely on a single specific international relations theory, 
because Swiss neutrality may be interpreted in light of various theories. Realism 
illuminates the external security function of neutrality. Idealism is expressed in the belief 
that solidarity and cooperation improve the credibility of neutrality and compensate for 
abstention during conflicts. Finally, constructivism suggests how neutrality has become a 
                                                 
29 Tibor S. Tresch and others, Sicherheit 2009: Aussen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitische 
Meinungsbildung im Trend (Zürich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik der ETH Zürich und 
Militärakademie an der ETH Zürich, 2009), http://www.css.ethz.ch/Sicherheit_2009.pdf (accessed January 
30, 2010). 
30 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences, BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005), 67. 
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major pillar of national identity. Each function of neutrality seems to have had a decisive 
impact on Swiss foreign policy at specific times. 
In order to maintain focus, this thesis does not address several aspects of Swiss 
neutrality or considers them only tangentially. Switzerland’s neutrality in the two World 
Wars is not discussed in detail. There is no room for a detailed discussion of the literature 
on the international relations of small states.31 There is also no comparison with the 
experiences of other permanently neutral states. Finally, the EU is addressed only in the 
conclusion. 
In addition to the sources mentioned in the literature review, the thesis relies on 
Swiss governmental documents, especially the Federal Council messages regarding the 
referendums, various expert reports about Swiss neutrality policy, the transcripts of the 
parliamentary discussions, and the archive of Swiss diplomatic documents.32 Post-
referendum analyses and articles in selected Swiss newspapers supplement those 
documents. 
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The thesis is organized in five chapters. After the introduction, Chapter II defines 
the historical and analytical framework. The case studies follow in Chapters III and IV 
and reflect the five research questions. The final chapter offers conclusions. 
The structure of the thesis reflects a historical chronology. This format was 
preferred for practical reasons instead of an organization by topics of comparison. 
However, the case studies are organized in a similar style to allow the reader to make a 
direct comparison across the two cases. 
                                                 
31 For a comprehensive literature review about small state studies see Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde 
Gstöhl, Lilliputians in Gulliver's World? Small States in International Relations (Reykjavik: Center for 
Small State Studies, 2004), 1–26, http://stofnanir.hi.is/ams/sites/files/ams/ 
Lilliputians%20Endanlegt%202004.pdf (accessed February 6, 2009). 
32 Swiss Confederation, “The Swiss Federal Archives: Online-Documents,” 
http://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/showHome.do (accessed April 24,2009); Swiss Parliament, 
“Curia Vista - Database of Parliamentary Proceedings,” http://www.parlament.ch/e/dokumentation/curia-
vista/pages/default.aspx (accessed April 24,2009); Institut für Politikwissenschaft der Universität Bern, 
“Swissvotes: Abstimmungsverzeichnis,” Universität Bern, http://www.swissvotes.ch/ (accessed April 24,  
2009). 
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The following introductory chapter presents a short overview of historical and 
theoretical analyses of neutrality and collective security. It defines some key terms and 
provides an overview of the analytical framework concerning neutrality that is used in 
this thesis. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the specific functions of neutrality for 
Swiss identity and security. 
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II. NEUTRALITY AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY 
A.  ORIGINS AND DEFINITIONS 
1.  Neutrality 
The Latin word neuter means of neither side, and this is the most basic common 
agreed definition of neutrality in international relations.33 In this simple form, neutrality 
is as old as the history of conflicts among individuals, groups, and states. Therefore, in 
the international system, neutrality is a function of war, and its content is influenced by 
the definition and the character of war and by the way war among states is perceived and 
regulated.34 If there were no more war, there would be no more neutrality. 
In addition, neutrality cannot stand alone. Neutrality needs a minimum of three 
actors and two different standpoints. It is always defined as a relationship of a neutral 
country with at least two potential belligerents, often great powers. Thus, neutrality is 
declared against something and between two external powers. Therefore, no neutrality is 
possible in the presence of a universal collective, a hegemony, or a worldwide norm. 
The third characteristic of neutrality is its non-belligerent approach.35 The aim of 
neutrality is peace through abstinence from war. But neutrality is not altruistic. The 
refusal to use force is absolute, even in the name of peace, and the only exception is self- 
defense. If force is not an option, neutrality relies on perceptions, beliefs, norms, and 
international guarantees in the form of international law and organizations.36 In sum, 
                                                 
33 Kruzel and Haltzel, Between the Blocs, xvii. 
34 Argirakos, Neutralität und Europäische Union, 37ff. 
35 This is even true for armed neutrality because, in the case of an attack, the neutral country would 
defend itself and thereby abandon its neutrality. The country might nonetheless still refuse to join the other 
side in a coalition and fight to achieve a “separate peace” detached from the larger conflict. The view that 
neutrality supports peace is, however, contested. James Lorimer stated in 1884: “To identify a policy of 
neutrality with the interests of international peace is one of the strangest hallucinations that ever took 
possession of clear-headed men.” Quoted in Quincy Wright, “The Present Status of Neutrality,” The 
American Journal of International Law 34, no. 3 (1940): 400, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2192922 
(accessed April 16, 2009). 
36 Jean-Marc Rickli, “European Small States’ Military Policies After the Cold War: From Territorial to 
Niche Strategies,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 21, no. 3 (2008): 311. 
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neutrality is the fusion of the reality of war with the idealistic belief in the feasibility of 
remaining at peace while other states engage in combat; it is the fusion of a self-interested 
autonomy with an intense international exchange. It involves elements of cooperation as 
well as competition. 
Modern neutrality is a European concept and closely mirrors European history. It 
is a historic offspring of state sovereignty and great power war in the era 1618-1918. 
Neutrality was discussed at some length by Hugo Grotius in his treatise on the law of war 
and peace in 1646.37 Neutrality originated in the concept of jus in bello, regulating the 
conduct of war. Neutrality reflects the growing idea after the Congress of Vienna in 1815 
that war was a natural tool for states to adjust the equilibrium of the international system. 
Each time two or more states fought a war, those who did not participate in the war were 
neutral. Neutrality was important because it limited the geographical scope of wars.38 The 
status of simple neutrality is unilaterally declared on case-by-case base by a state that 
does not wish to participate in a war.39 This idea of simple neutrality has survived until 
the present day. In 1907 the relationship between belligerents and neutral states was 
codified as the law of neutrality in The Hague Conventions. Even though the laws of 
neutrality could not keep up with the developments of modern warfare, its core 
regulations are still binding for countries that declare their neutrality during a conflict.   
In the nineteenth century, the European great powers developed a balance of 
power system. There was a mutual interest in clarifying the status of small states that 
created buffer zones, occupied key strategic territories, or were at the periphery of the 
                                                 
37 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres; Volume Two, The Translation, trans. Francis W. 
Kelsey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925), Book III, Chapter XVII, 783-787. Hugo Grotius established the 
jus ad bellum theory. However, he also prescribed some principles for neutral states. John Ross has 
summarized two of these principles as follows: “(1) The neutral must not aid an ‘unjust cause’ in a war, nor 
hinder a ‘just’ one; and (2) when there is doubt as to which party’s cause is the more just, the neutral must 
treat both parties equally.” John F. L. Ross, Neutrality and International Sanctions : Sweden, Switzerland, 
and Collective Security (New York: Praeger, 1989), 4. 
38 For a detailed historical summary, see Karsh, Neutrality and Small States, 13ff. 
39 Even if neutrality is not declared, there is a basic assumption in international law that all parties that 
do not participate in a conflict are perceived as neutral. For a detailed analysis of simple neutrality, see 
Argirakos, Neutralität und Europäische Union, 43–92. 
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continent.40 To add stability and predictability to the system, the great powers granted 
several states a status of permanent neutrality.41 This meant that these states would be 
neutral in peacetime and in any conflict as long as they were not attacked. In return, they 
had to organize an autonomous and credible defense of their territory, and this justified 
their status of armed neutrality.42 Armed neutrality is evidence for the realist assumption 
that the concept of neutrality could fail. It led to a specific type of defense. Its main goal 
was to dissuade possible neutrality violators. In contrast to deterrence, “dissuasion … is 
not based on threats of retaliation but on increasing the costs of invasion.” The 
consequence was “a strategic culture that considers the use of force only for defense 
purposes,” a concept that often evolved into “total defense.”43 As an example, the Swiss 
militia system, “unlike conscription … is not aimed at winning a war or defeating the 
enemy’s army but at preserving the country’s independence; therefore, the neutrals’ 
concept of a soldier was closer to the idea of ‘citizen in uniform than the one of 
warriors.’”44 Switzerland is the classic case of a country with an internationally 
recognized status of permanent, armed neutrality.  
The introduction of permanent neutrality led to a distinction between the law of 
neutrality and neutrality policy. The law of neutrality refers to The Hague Conventions, 
which regulate the behavior of neutral countries in war. Neutrality policy “includes each 
of the measures a state takes—voluntarily, independent of neutrality law—in order to 
guarantee the efficiency and credibility of its neutrality.”45 Furthermore, permanently 
neutral countries avoid any policy that could drag them into a conflict or affect their 
ability to remain neutral during wartime. Neutrality policy, therefore, is a flexible 
concept, which adjusts to the international environment. Efraim Karsh explained the 
                                                 
40 Karsh, Neutrality and Small States, 81. 
41 For a typology of neutral states see Argirakos, Neutralität und Europäische Union, 117ff. 
42 Further obligations are nonparticipation in a military alliance, enforcing the law of neutrality during 
conflicts, and not hosting foreign military bases on the neutral state’s territory. To reinforce the credibility 
of their neutrality, permanently neutral states often take additional measures. For a detailed comparison of 
permanently neutral states, see Subedi, Neutrality in a Changing World, 241–249.  
43 Rickli, Neutrality: From a Small State's Power Instrument to a Powerful Identity Provider, 2,4. 
44 Rickli, European Small States’ Military Policies, 312. 
45 Goetschel, Bernath and Schwarz, Swiss Foreign Policy, 15. 
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relationship between the two terms: “The raison d’être of neutrality is political, while its 
institutionalization in international law is merely an instrumental act.”46 
The century prior to World War I was the heyday of neutrality. The long peace 
after 1815 supported the positive international perception of neutrality. In 1919, R.F. 
Roxburgh wrote: “Thus neutrality as a maxim of state policy seemed to possess high 
ethical quality when contrasted with the horrors of war, and to embody a sound national 
policy in regard to commerce and finance.”47 The First World War, however, marked the 
end of an era in which a moral justification for being neutral was not needed. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, three developments led to the decline of 
the balance of power system and as a consequence to the erosion of neutrality. First, the 
further industrialization of war made it difficult to limit combat geographically. Second, 
the rise of nationalism and totalitarian ideologies transformed the nature of warfare 
beyond the pure distribution of power function. It added a layer of moral conviction to 
war. Ideology, like religion, goes beyond national sovereignty and leads theoretically to 
total, unrestricted war, which excludes neutrality. Finally, the terrifying experience of 
World War I revived the idea of collective security in the form of the League of Nations. 
The response was differential neutrality. According to this concept, it is the policy of a 
neutral state to support the economic and political sanctions of a collective security 
system, while abstaining from active support of military measures.48 
The Second World War discredited not only the idea of collective security (at 
least as formulated in the Covenant of the League of Nations), but also neutrality as a 
practical survival strategy for small countries.49 Even though Switzerland avoided a 
German invasion, other neutral nations did not. The creation of the United Nations (UN) 
                                                 
46 Karsh, Neutrality and Small States, 3–4. 
47 Roxburgh, Changes in the Conception of Neutrality, 20. It can be argued that for historical reasons, 
most of the Swiss would still embrace this statement. 
48 The terminology “differential neutrality” was only used in the League of Nations. However, in this 
paper it is also used for neutrality in the UN. Furthermore, there is no standard opinion to which degree the 
neutrality of a state should “differ” between traditional conflicts and collective actions. 
49 The lucky exceptions—above all, Switzerland and Sweden—nonetheless were more convinced than 
ever that neutrality would protect them. 
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could hardly conceal the fact that the world was still dominated by power politics. In the 
Cold War, the bipolarity of the world system allowed traditional neutrality between the 
blocs. Because of the ideological nature of the conflict, the neutral countries 
reemphasized that they were not obliged to be ideologically neutral.50 In the 1990s, 
neutrality faded away together with communism. In the euphoria of a functioning UN 
Security Council and in the absence of a visible enemy, neutrality had a hard time. Again, 
the European neutral countries reacted quickly and declared membership in the European 
Union (EU), the UN, and the NATO Partnership for Peace program (PfP) as compatible 
with their neutrality.51 Today, neutrality is under pressure from four sides: the revival of 
collective security, the increased supranational integration of the EU, the rise of a 
potentially hegemonic power (namely, the United States), and the technical difficulties of 
implementing a neutrality policy in a globalized, networked world. 
Because there is no recognized definition of neutrality, two additional views 
should be offered. Karsh provides a simple definition by stating that “[N]eutrality is 
nothing but an attempt … to find a solution to one of the most fundamental problems of a 
state: maintaining its independence and sovereignty in wartime.”52 Jean-Marc Rickli 
provided a more sophisticated explanation by stating that neutrality is a “foreign policy 
principle whose purpose is the preservation of the independence and sovereignty of small 
states through non-participation and impartiality in international conflict.”53 
In sum, neutrality is difficult to define and encompasses several concepts that are 
related to the historical context. Its definition has been influenced by legal, theoretical, 
and political considerations. 
                                                 
50 Kruzel and Haltzel, Between the Blocs, 37. Ideological neutrality was repeatedly requested, first by 
Nazi Germany and later, to some extent, by the Soviet Union. Verdross, Austria’s Permanent Neutrality, 
64. 
51 The Federal Council declared in 1993 that future membership in the EU and the UN would be 
compatible with neutrality. Moreover, it said that participation in a NATO forum such as the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council, which would not involve actual membership in the Alliance, would be acceptable. 
See Schweizer Bundesrat, Bericht zur Neutralität (Bern: EDA, 1993), 
http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/doc/publi.Par.0005.File.tmp/Bericht%20zur%20
Neutralitaet%201993.pdf (accessed February 7, 2009). 
52 Karsh, Neutrality and Small States, 5. 
53 Rickli, Neutrality: From a Small State's Power Instrument to a Powerful Identity Provider, 3. 
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2.  Collective Security 
In contrast to neutrality, which is rooted in jus in bello, law regulating the conduct 
of wars, collective security is based in jus ad bellum, law regulating the right for wars. 
Immanuel Kant, one of the most famous thinkers about collective security, provided a 
theoretical foundation for “the reign of law” in the international realm.54 The Kantian 
worldview was prominently promoted by Woodrow Wilson, one of the leading 
champions of the League of Nations. According to Martin Wight, collective security is “a 
system in which any breach of the peace is declared to be of concern to all the 
participating states, and an attack on one is taken as an attack on all.”55 Collective 
security, therefore, “involves a pact against war; the threat is aggression by a currently 
unidentified party to the pact, which should ideally include all the states in the state 
system.”56 
The very idea that “security is indivisible” has some logical consequences for the 
members of collective security organizations.57 First, participants in a collective security 
system tend to see war, the use of force, as a way of solving international disputes that 
can be legal only under certain circumstances. Second, if the use of force is legal only 
under certain conditions, other means of conflict resolution gain importance. Collective 
security systems focus on preventive measures, short of war, to find a peaceful solution to 
disputes. Third, all member states of a collective security system are required to support 
these measures in some form. Fourth, maximum effectiveness is achieved if the collective 
security system is universal. Fifth, if collective security is to work, an enforcing 
mechanism and a decision-making mechanism to activate it must be in place. Kant and 
Wilson promoted two additional characteristics, the legal equality of the member states 
                                                 
54 For a discussion of the history of collective security and the influence of Immanuel Kant and 
Woodrow Wilson, see David S. Yost, NATO Transformed : The Alliance's New Roles in International 
Security (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 5–20. See also Immanuel Kant, 
Zum ewigen Frieden (Königsberg: Institut für Kommunikationsforschung und Phonetik, Universität Bonn, 
1795), http://www.ikp.uni-bonn.de/kant/aa08/341.html (accessed February 22, 2009). 
55 Wight quoted in Yost, NATO Transformed, 9. 
56 Ibid., 7. 
57 Ibid., 6. 
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and the democratic nature of the collective security organization and its members. 
Although these aspects may support the sustainability of the system, they are not 
necessarily indispensable requirements for a successful collective security arrangement. 
These characteristics of a collective security system are similar to the organization 
of the monopoly of legitimate violence within a sovereign state. Security is seen as a 
public good provided by a higher authority. In return, the citizen has to obey the law, 
refrain from taking the law into his own hands, and support in person and/or through 
taxes the police and the military. At the international level, this logic leads to the most 
important characteristic of collective security, which is the principle that “the 
unconditional and unbridled national sovereignty of each state is … incompatible with 
the security of all.”58 Indeed, in theory, this transfer of authority in a collective security 
system could take the form of a loose cooperative association of states, a weak 
confederation, a global democracy, or a global authoritarian hegemony.  
Collective security should not be confused with collective defense. David Yost 
stated that “a collective defense pact binds together an alliance of states to deter and, if 
necessary, defend against one or more identifiable external threats, a state or group of 
states outside the alliance.”59 An alliance does not deny the risk of war. Indeed, it 
believes in an external threat and its purpose is to accumulate strength in the tradition of 
the balance of power idea. 
To what degree was the League of Nations a collective security system?60 Based 
on the above mentioned criteria, the League was far from perfect. The League’s strength 
resided in the fact that all member states, aside from Switzerland, had equal rights and 
duties under the collective security system of the Covenant.61 On the other hand, the 
 
 
                                                 
58 Rappard, The United Nations and Switzerland, 70. 
59 Yost, NATO Transformed, 7. 
60 The next paragraphs about the League of Nations and the United Nations provide only a short 
overview. For further details see Chapters III and IV. 
61 The League exempted Switzerland from supporting military sanctions. See Chapter III. 
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League lacked universality, did not completely ban war, and accepted totalitarian member 
states. Most important, the organization had a weak decision-making system and no 
enforcement capabilities.  
The United Nations is not dramatically different.62 In contrast to the League, the 
UN reached universality, legally banned aggressive war, and established, in theory, an 
effective sanction and enforcement system, although the idea of a UN military force was 
never implemented. The major weakness of the UN is the fact that the five permanent 
members of the Security Council are, by their right of veto, in practice not subject to the 
collective security system. They have no duties, and even worse, they could, if they were 
united, rather easily acquire a majority in the Security Council and dominate the world at 
will. Whether this is still a collective security system seems questionable.63 
3.  Neutrality and Collective Security 
A wise man avoids other people’s quarrels—this is the argument, at its 
simplest, of the neutral. You cannot be neutral between right and wrong—
this is the argument, at its simplest, of the critic of neutrality. The history 
of neutrality, as a legal and political institution, has swung between the 
two arguments.64   
       —Martin Wight 
Collective security, by definition, adds the notion of right and wrong to war. 
Aggressive war is illegal, and therefore wrong. Military action taken, or legitimized, by 
the collective security organization is right. There is no neutrality between the collective 
security organization and the aggressor. Furthermore, each state that chooses not to 
participate in the system is undermining the universality of the organization and 
weakening its sanctions. “The closer the international organization approaches to 
universality, the greater will be the pressure to prevent interference with its decisions and 
the less possible will it be to maintain the traditional position of neutral or even non-
                                                 
62 For a concise comparison of League and UN, see Ross, Neutrality and International Sanctions, 14–
15. 
63 See also Yost, NATO Transformed, 17. 
64 Wight, The Idea of Neutrality. 
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participant.”65 In addition, neutrality is inapplicable because the theory of collective 
security holds that no state can refuse to support military or nonmilitary sanctions against 
an aggressor. In sum, from a theoretical standpoint, neutrality is a threat to the Kantian 
peace and incompatible with collective security.66 
In theory and in practice, however, there are three reasons why neutrality remains 
possible. First, the lack of universality can lead to traditional wars that are out of the 
reach of the organization. Second, if the system of collective security is unable to act, 
neutrality remains an option. Third, and most important, it is difficult to ignore the fact 
that the ideas of neutrality and collective security both have the same aim, peace. This 
peace-oriented aspect of neutrality is why the League of Nations granted Switzerland a 
limited neutral status as a member state. 
What is the impact of collective arrangements on state sovereignty? The collective 
nature of alliances and of collective security systems limits the sovereignty of member 
states. In a collective security system, members are obliged to act against any state that 
resorts to war. In a collective defense system, members are obliged to share the burden 
for defending an attacked member state. In contrast, a neutral country, in theory, is not 
obliged to express solidarity or to support defensive (or offensive) operations. Its 
sovereignty is only constricted by the obligation not to support any belligerent party. In 
this sense, “neutrality is an expression of sovereignty.”67 As the next section shows, 
sovereignty and independence are important in the case of Switzerland.       
                                                 
65 Taubenfeld, International Actions and Neutrality, 396. 
66 See Gabriel, Die Gegenläufigkeit von Neutralität, 9. See also Graham, The Effect of the League of 
Nations Covenant, 360. 
67 Goetschel, Neutrality, a really Dead Concept?, 119. 
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B.  SWISS NEUTRALITY 
1. History 
This section gives a short introduction to the long and complex history of Swiss 
neutrality.68 The country has practiced neutrality since it gained formal independence in 
the Treaty of Münster in 1648.69 At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the great powers 
recognized and guaranteed Switzerland’s “neutralité perpétuelle.”70 Edgar Bonjour 
proposed six historic origins of Swiss neutrality. After the Swiss abandoned their great 
power aspirations in the early sixteenth century, a foreign policy of neutrality allowed 
them to focus on inner cohesion and the strengthening of the loose federation. Later, 
neutrality prevented the religious wars in Europe from sweeping over the multi-
confessional country.71 Geography, especially the strategic passes over the Alps, was 
instrumental for the sustainability of Swiss neutrality. Furthermore, the Swiss learned to 
perfection the instrument of neutrality because of the long domestic experience with 
neutral cantons in the old confederation. The fact that the Swiss got accustomed to 
balancing off in practice the incompatible written provisions of the European powers, in 
order to keep the middle ground between the big rivals, was another factor. Finally, the 
balance of power system of the eighteenth century was the most fertile ground for Swiss 
neutrality.72   
Since 1815, Switzerland’s foreign policy has defended the institution of neutrality 
by strengthening international law. Furthermore, it has tried repeatedly to renew 
international recognition of its neutral status. In many respects, the country has set its 
own historic standard for permanent neutrality. John Ross stated: “The Swiss have in fact 
                                                 
68 For a detailed history of Swiss neutrality until the end of World War II, see Bonjour, Geschichte der 
Schweizerischen Neutralität. For a follow up, see Kreis, Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart.   
69 Argirakos, Neutralität und Europäische Union, 133. 
70 The fact that the great powers guaranteed Switzerland’s neutrality was an indirect security 
guarantee. Ibid., 149. 
71 It is important to mention that Switzerland has cross cutting religious and linguistic cleavages. 
These are overlapped by a traditional urban-rural split. The centrifugal forces of language and culture were 
at their height in World War I and World War II. One should also not forget that Switzerland was for 
decades a liberal, republican island in the middle of European kingdoms, dynasties and empires. 
72 Bonjour, Geschichte der Schweizerischen Neutralität, 7–14. 
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demonstrated a remarkable ability to induce special recognition of their neutrality on the 
basis of its tradition and presumed benefits for the general ‘cause of peace.’”73 Despite 
the high standing of Swiss neutrality, there was only a minor reference to the concept in 
the first federal constitution of 1848. This is clear evidence that, at least until World War 
I, neutrality was perceived as a simple foreign policy instrument. 
The next two chapters show in detail how Swiss neutrality changed and adapted in 
response to the international environment after 1914. The concept received a boost during 
both world wars, when the country managed to protect its independence. In 1920, in a 
historic decision, the Swiss joined the League of Nations and adopted a policy of 
differential neutrality. In 1938, it returned to its previous policy of integral neutrality.74 
This policy was cemented after World War II, when the government refused to join the 
UN, and neutrality became a doctrine and a foreign policy aim. In 1965, as Chapter IV 
shows, there were initial signs of a possible return to differential neutrality. It was not 
until 1993, however, that the governmental neutrality report stated that “the restrictive 
understanding of neutrality during the Cold War was replaced in favor of an increased 
freedom of action.“75 After 1991, the country followed a de facto differential neutrality 
policy. In 2005, another governmental report summarized the current Swiss position: 
“Permanent neutrality as a guiding principle of Swiss foreign and security policy is well-
proven. The Federal Council sees no necessity to redefine Swiss neutrality.”76 
The Swiss at no point seriously questioned the core idea of neutrality by opting 
for membership in an alliance or by conducting an aggressive security policy. The 
reasons for this continuity are found in the different functions of Swiss neutrality.   
                                                 
73 Ross, Neutrality and International Sanctions, 212. 
74 The term integral neutrality was used to show the difference from differential neutrality. 
75 Interdepartementale Arbeitsgruppe, Neutralitätspraxis der Schweiz - Aktuelle Aspekte (Bern: EDA, 
2000), 1, http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/doc/publi.Par.0009.File.tmp/ 
Neutralitaetspraxis%20der%20Schweiz%20-%20aktuelle%20Aspekte.pdf (accessed February 7, 2009). 
Translation by the author. 
76 Schweizer Bundesrat, Die Neutralität auf dem Prüfstand im Irak-Konflikt (Bern: EDA, 2005), 6999, 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2005/6997.pdf (accessed February 7, 2009). Translation by the author. 
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2. Functions 
Up to this point, the chapter has discussed neutrality primarily as a function of 
international security and law. According to Karl Haltiner, however, the security provider 
role is only one of three functions of Swiss neutrality.  
First, the security function “ensures that a state is not drawn into an international 
conflict; it contributes to stability in Europe and it gives military protection.”77 This 
function has a dual role by supporting internal integration and external independence.78 
The internal dimension of neutrality, to avoid civil war because of religious, ideological, 
or nationalistic wars among neighboring states, has lost its meaning since the end of 
World War II. Since the end of the Cold War, in the absence of a major threat, the 
external function has lost most of its practical value. This change, however, is only 
partially reflected in public opinion and in Swiss foreign policy.79 Moreover, the current 
absence of a major threat—and of religious, ideological, or nationalistic conflicts among 
neighboring states—does not constitute a guarantee that such threats and conflicts could 
not arise in the future. 
Second, the international solidarity function includes “the good offices as a 
mediator during conflict.”80 Switzerland has a long tradition of offering good offices such 
as taking over diplomatic mandates of belligerent states, negotiating peace agreements, 
and offering its territory for peace conferences. The Swiss population increasingly 
                                                 
77 Neutrality functions as described in Karl W. Haltiner and others, Sicherheit 2007: Aussen-, 
Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitische Meinungsbildung im Trend (Zürich: Forschungsstelle für 
Sicherheitspolitik der ETH Zürich und Militärakademie an der ETH Zürich, 2007), 115, 
http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=47&fileid=A0903CF1-2FE2-5538-A2E3-
3820E4F046A5&lng=de (accessed May 8, 2009). Translation by the author. 
78 Riklin, Neutralität am Ende?, 13. 
79 In 2009, 65 percent of the Swiss stated that neutrality prevents Switzerland from being drawn into 
an international conflict, and 57 percent said that Swiss neutrality increases security and stability in Europe. 
There is, however, an assumption that neutrality cannot be protected by military means (46 percent) and 
that it does not protect Switzerland from terrorism (65 percent). Tresch and others, Sicherheit 2009, 124. 
80 Haltiner and others, Sicherheit 2007, 115. Translation by the author. 
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supports the solidarity function at a remarkably high level.81 The fact that the people 
support neutrality (93 percent) and its solidarity function (92 percent) at an equally high 
level is evidence that solidarity is an integral part of neutrality in Swiss assessments.82 
This might support a broader public interpretation of the solidarity function beyond the 
traditional good offices. 
Third, the national identity function includes “the effects of the model character of 
Swiss neutrality and the symbolic link between neutrality and Swiss nationhood.”83 
Modern Swiss national identity is a product of nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. In contrast to many neighboring states, the multilingual and multiconfessional 
country could not base its identity on a single ethnicity, language or culture. Instead, 
political values and institutions, shared historical experiences, geography, and an 
“artificial” Swiss culture were used to construct a distinct identity based on “civic 
exceptionalism.”84 The national identity function of neutrality massively increased in 
importance in response to the threat of World War II and due to the strict neutrality 
policy after 1946. In 2009, 83 percent of the Swiss believed that “neutrality is inseparably 
linked with national identity.”85 
It is evident from the description of the three functions that any analysis of Swiss 
neutrality from a purely foreign policy perspective must fail. Jürg Gabriel rightly stated: 
“The Swiss ‘special case’ (Sonderfall) cannot be explained through neutrality alone. The 
                                                 
81 A detailed study shows that Switzerland’s good offices and mediation efforts have sharply declined, 
especially since the end of the Cold War. This decline, however, was to some extent compensated for by 
increased activities in multilateral fora. Daniel Trachsler, “Gute Dienste - Mythen, Fakten, Perspektiven,” 
Bulletin 2004 zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik 11 (2004): 61–64, 
http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/topics/peasec/peac.Par.0035.File.tmp/rp_Gute%2
0DiensteETH_de.pdf (accessed April 16, 2009). 
82 Tresch and others, Sicherheit 2009, 122, 125. 
83 Haltiner and others, Sicherheit 2007, 115. Translation by the author. 
84 Defining elements of Swiss identity include the struggle for independence, direct democracy, the 
milita system, the consensual political system, federalism, “alpine rural culture,” neutrality, and a strong 
belief in the long tradition and history of the country. See Oliver Zimmer, “Boundary Mechanisms and 
Symbolic Resources: Towards a Process-Oriented Approach to National Identity,” Nations and 
Nationalism 9, no. 2 (April 2003): 173–193, http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-
bin/fulltext/118851163/PDFSTART (accessed April 20, 2009).  
85 Tresch and others, Sicherheit 2009, 125. Translation by the author. 
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decisive factors are more fundamental and domestic in nature; it is the constitutive 
elements of its political system that prevent Switzerland from reacting appropriately to 
changes in its external environment.” These elements are the other building blocks of 
Swiss identity, namely direct democracy, the consensual political system, a collegial 
executive, federalism, and the militia system.86 
The next section offers an overview of theoretical and analytical approaches to 
neutrality in general and Swiss neutrality in particular. 
C.  THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Theories of Neutrality 
As mentioned in the introduction, no theory of neutrality exists. One reason may 
be that, “Wherever moral or religious thought has been the basis for political theory, 
neutrality could not be accepted.“87 Another reason is that there are “as many kinds of 
neutrality as there are neutral states.”88 Several authors, however, have used existing 
theories in different academic fields to explain the general behavior of neutral states. 
Based on realism and the balance of power theory, “the traditional security 
dilemma for small states is … between protecting autonomy or maximizing influence.” 
Their options for influence are either balancing or band-wagoning.89 The option for 
autonomy is neutrality.90 Gregory Raymond has shown, however, that “realism has only 
modest explanatory power in accounting for the salience of neutrality norms.” 
Furthermore, the assumption that “the less the concentration of military capabilities, the 
greater the salience of neutrality” is only true during times of peace.91 One can conclude 
                                                 
86 The word “appropriately” is debatable. Gabriel and Fanzun, The Asymmetries of Swiss Foreign 
Policy, 4, 8–14. 
87 Thomas, Theory of Neutrality, 165. 
88 Andrén quoted in Raymond, Neutrality Norms and the Balance of Power, 126. 
89 Rickli, European Small States' Military Policies, 310. 
90 There is a debate if, from a realist perspective, neutrality is supported by the system. See Rickli, 
Neutrality: From a Small State's Power Instrument to a Powerful Identity Provider, 2. 
91 Raymond, Neutrality Norms and the Balance of Power, 135–136. Karsh even takes the position that 
a balance of power system that is in equilibrium is an imminent threat to neutrality. Karsh, Neutrality and 
Small States, 98–101.   
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that, first, the security function of neutrality increases in response to wars; and second, as 
long as the system remains multi-polar, changes in the distribution of power in the 
international system do not influence neutrality.92 This supports the hypothesis of this 
study that Switzerland joined the League and the UN at times when the security function 
of neutrality was in relative decline due to the absence of an external threat. A different 
explanation would be that “the benevolent unipolar strategic environment” after the end 
of the Cold War led to a situation in which “cooperative strategies become the only 
realistic strategic option” for small states.93 Furthermore, Hans Mouritzen concluded in a 
study that “a ‘successful’ foreign policy tradition sedimented in the political culture” can 
override balancing concerns.94 
This leads to another level of analysis, the role of norms and domestic institutions 
in foreign policy. There is evidence, according to the constructivist school of thought, 
that the role perceptions of states dominate their behavior in the international system.95 In 
the Swiss case, neutrality is “a principled belief whose political core consists of interest-
based, normative ideas on foreign and security-policy orientation.”96 The strong identity 
and solidarity functions of Swiss neutrality are evidence that neutrality is indeed not only 
a security concept, but a belief, a norm, and a part of the shared understanding of 
Switzerland’s “special case” in the international system. 
Finally, Efraim Karsh provides a useful analytical framework for neutrality. In a 
first step, he liberates neutrality from its ideological, legal, and theoretical baggage by 
                                                 
92 See Raymond, Neutrality Norms and the Balance of Power, 137. This view is also supported by 
Tresch, who observes that the security function of neutrality stands out in relation to external threats, in 
theory and in public opinion. To define the external threat, or the perception of an external threat, however, 
is difficult. Tresch and others, Sicherheit 2009, 124–125.  
93 Rickli, European Small States' Military Policies, 314. 
94 This positive attachment to the past is well observed in the case of Switzerland. Hans Mouritzen, 
“Choosing Sides in the European Iraq Conflict: A Test of New Geopolitical Theory,” European Security 
15, no. 2 (2006): 152, http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/09662830600903686 (accessed January 31, 
2010). 
95 For a detailed discussion, see Karen Devine, “Stretching the IR Theoretical Spectrum on Irish 
Neutrality: A Critical Social Constructivist Framework,” International Political Science Review 29, no. 4 
(September 2008): 461–488 (accessed January 23, 2009); See also Devine, Deconstructing Concepts of 
Irish Neutrality, 115–139. 
96 Goetschel, Neutrality, a really Dead Concept?, 117. 
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stating that “there is not necessarily a direct correlation between the worth, status and 
innate impact of neutrality as a legal institution or a moral idea, and its status as a 
political instrument.”97 This is the basis for another argument of this thesis—the 
incompatibilities of neutrality and collective security are to a large extent theoretical and 
not relevant in practice. Second, Karsh vehemently rejects the conventional wisdom that 
neutrality is a passive and reactive concept.98 Finally, he offers a model of the “operative 
dimensions of neutrality”:  
The positive component of neutral policy involves persuading the 
belligerents [or in peacetime potential belligerents] of the advantages they 
might derive from the continued existence of the neutrality in question. 
The negative component, on the other hand, implies deterrence of the 
belligerents from violating the neutrality as a result of their conviction of 
the disproportionate cost of such a step.99   
Karsh shows then that both components “might present a trade off 
relationship.”100 This supports the remaining argument of this thesis that the decline of 
military neutrality has been compensated by international solidarity. Karsh mentioned 
that “Switzerland’s attitude towards international co-operation has further reinforced the 
universal image of Swiss neutrality.”101 
This section reviewed some general observations about the behavior and 
motivations of neutral states. It did not, however, explain the possible mechanisms that 
lead to specific decisions in Swiss foreign policy. The next section describes the 
interaction of neutrality with domestic and foreign policy.  
 
                                                 
97 Karsh, Neutrality and Small States, 5. 
98 Ibid., 32. 
99 Ibid., 33. 
100 Ibid., 33. 
101 Ibid., 165. 
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2. Neutrality and Domestic and Foreign Policy 
“Swiss foreign policy is strongly influenced by federalist, non-centralist, and 
parliament-oriented components.” Since 1848, parliamentary involvement in foreign 
policy has increased steadily. In addition, “the federal constitution grants the people 
ultimate power when making and legitimising foreign policy.”102 This institution of 
direct democracy allows the Swiss people and the cantons to take key foreign policy 
decisions at the ballot box, for example, about membership in international organizations. 
The consequences are manifold. First, foreign policy in Switzerland is to a large 
degree influenced by domestic policy. Second, referendums can be influenced by short 
term domestic issues. Third, because of the consensus system in the executive, the part 
time parliamentary system, and the rather independent bureaucracy, foreign policy 
decisions “occur in seclusion.”103 Fourth, Swiss foreign policy is constrained by national 
identity and role concepts; and this leads to a time lag between external events and 
internal reactions. “Analysis of Swiss foreign policy shows that although certain national 
role concepts no longer corresponded to outside expectations and so became irrelevant in 
the international setting, they remain central to Swiss national identity.”104 These factors 
make it a daunting task to analyze cause and effect in Swiss foreign policy. 
Swiss foreign policy is characterized by many dualisms—openness and isolation, 
cooperation and autonomy, neutrality and solidarity, independence and collective 
security.105 Moos showed that in the past these poles were expressed in the form of 
liberal, radical Protestant ideas and traditional, conservative Catholic values.106 
Furthermore, this chapter showed that these contradictions are inherently embedded in 
neutrality, in theory and in practice. 
                                                 
102 For details, see Goetschel, Bernath and Schwarz, Swiss Foreign Policy, 44. 
103 Ibid., 58. 
104 Ibid., 149. 
105 For one aspect of this dualism, economic integration versus political isolation, see Gabriel and 
Fanzun, The Asymmetries of Swiss Foreign Policy. 
106 Moos, Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO, 17ff. 
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Another serious analytical problem resides in the gaps separating the official 
neutrality discourse, the practical application of neutrality in foreign policy, and the 
perception of neutrality in the general population. Georg Kreis showed in his extensive 
study of Switzerland’s neutrality discourse since 1943 that the neutrality discussions of 
the political elite were essentially a “process of continuous self-reassurance,” and not a 
real debate about actual foreign policy.107 Second, the relative success of neutrality in the 
Cold War reinforced the existing perception of neutrality and the idea of Switzerland’s 
special role in the international system. Finally, Kreis showed abundant evidence, 
especially in the language used, that neutrality had a sacral connotation.108 One has to 
conclude that Swiss debates about neutrality have had to a large extent a ritual function of 
supporting national identity, instead of discussing real world issues. The same is true for 
the population. Peter Moser argued that there are “some reasons to believe that an 
automatism” takes over when people respond to the question of neutrality. This would 
also explain the suspiciously high rates of support for the concept.109 Karsh shows, 
however, that permanently neutral countries, in order to overcome the credibility problem 
of neutrality, tend to declare neutrality as their “raison d’être.”110    
Related to this problem, and important for this thesis, is the conclusion of Carlo 
Moos. His comparison of the referendum debates showed that the arguments and aims of 
opponents and supporters of Swiss participation in a collective security organization have 
been remarkably similar. Consequently Moos could not explain the different outcomes at 
the argumentative level. Instead, the specific result of a referendum about participation in 
a collective security organization had to be explained by the particular historical context 
and political environment and, finally, by the differences between the League and the 
UN.111 
                                                 
107 Kreis, Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart, 14. 
108 Ibid., 339, 350. 
109 Moser quoted in  Ibid., 15. Translation by the author. There are not many questions one can ask a 
democratic people and obtain a 93 percent support rate. 
110 Karsh, Neutrality and Small States, 36–37. 
111 Moos, Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO, 10. 
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Tibor Tresch also took note of these irrational aspects of Swiss policy. He saw a 
“cognitive dissonance” in the fact that a large majority of the Swiss supported neutrality, 
while at the same time the positive effects and the practical value of neutrality were 
questioned.112 Hans-Peter Brunner mentioned the “irrational national consensus” that 
most Swiss saw “independence and neutrality” as “indivisibly intertwined.”113 In this 
sense, the humorous comment that “whatever the Swiss do, it’s neutral” has its 
significance in analyzing Swiss neutrality. 
In sum, this thesis is not designed to support, or to challenge, any theories of 
international relations or neutrality. It does not focus on any one of the three levels of 
analysis, namely the systemic, domestic or individual level.114 Instead, this chapter is 
intended to promote a better understanding of the two historical case studies in 
Chapter III (Switzerland’s neutrality and the League of Nations) and Chapter IV (its 
relationship with the United Nations). 
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113 Brunner cited in Goetschel, Bernath and Schwarz, Swiss Foreign Policy, 16. 
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III. SWISS NEUTRALITY AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyzes the relationship between Switzerland and the League of 
Nations in the era 1919-1945. It is the first of two case studies of collective security 
systems. Efraim Karsh states why studying the League is essential, and appropriate for 
the subject of this thesis: 
The establishment of the League of Nations represented the first operative 
attempt to found a “better world” on the basis of collective security. At the 
same time, it brought to surface the constant tension between the ideas of 
neutrality and universal cooperation and threatened … to banish the 
political and legal phenomenon of neutrality from the international 
scene.115 
The chapter investigates which international and domestic factors led to 
Switzerland’s accession to the League, and how this affected the theory and practice of 
Swiss neutrality. 
The main argument of this chapter is that the debate over League membership 
provided the intellectual rationale for the compatibility of collective security and 
neutrality. The rationale is the source of an original Swiss concept, the distinction 
between the laws of neutrality and neutrality policy, and the fusion of economic partiality 
and military impartiality in the form of differential neutrality. Differential neutrality is, 
despite its colossal failure in the 1930s, the origin of a lasting relationship between 
neutrality and solidarity. Furthermore, the political campaign in 1919–1920 set the basic 
arguments for domestic neutrality and the collective security debate for almost a century. 
Switzerland joined the League because the unique international environment after World 
War I opened a rare window of opportunity for redefining Swiss foreign policy. This, in 
conjunction with a united and pro-active government, allowed for a small majority over 
the traditionalistic, isolationistic German-speaking cantons. Finally, the League’s failure 
 
                                                 
115 Karsh, International Co-Operation and Neutrality, 57–58. 
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discredited the idea of collective security in the eyes of the Swiss population until the 
present day, and it paved the road for a narrow and inflexible neutrality conception during 
World War II and the Cold War. 
The structure of this chapter mirrors two turning points in Switzerland’s 
relationship with the League and in its century-old neutrality. The next section discusses 
the reasons why Switzerland joined the League in 1920 and how the necessary public 
support was acquired. A subsequent section describes how, from 1920 to 1938, the new 
policy of differential neutrality was implemented. Finally, the chapter analyzes the 
underlying reasons for Switzerland’s dispute with the League in 1938 over the sanctions 
against Italy, and consequently, Switzerland’s return to integral neutrality116 and the 
long-term effects of that decision.  
B. THE 1920 REFERENDUM AND ACCESSION TO THE LEAGUE 
1. Introduction 
Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world 
is involved and the freedom of its people.  
    —Woodrow Wilson, April 2, 1917117 
The Great War from 1914 to 1918 transformed greatly the foundations of the 
international system. Belligerents on both sides violated the neutral status of Belgium, 
Greece, and Luxembourg. At sea, the economic character of the war made it impossible 
to differentiate between the ships of neutral states and adversaries. The global, economic, 
and total character of warfare led to the practical, legal, and moral decline of neutrality. 
Thus, only Mexico, Persia, Spain, Switzerland and some smaller South American states 
were able to maintain their neutrality.118 The traditional European balance of power 
system of 1815 had definitely proved its inability to limit wars and to act as a useful tool 
to constrain the anarchy of the international system and it vanished in turn at war’s end. 
                                                 
116 Integral neutrality, military neutrality and traditional neutrality are used as synonyms for a narrow 
neutrality conception based on the international laws of neutrality. 
117 Wilson quoted in Wright, The Present Status of Neutrality, 391. 
118 Argirakos, Neutralität und Europäische Union, 158–163. 
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In sum, after World War I, as an analyst wrote in 1927, neutrality was a “status 
without the means for effective extra-territorial enforcement of rights, a condition heavily 
fraught with thankless duties…. Its practical bearing had been definitely curtailed, its 
legal embodiments severely shaken.”119 
In 1918, American President Woodrow Wilson, in his famous Fourteen Points, 
formulated a vision of a new world order, a Kantian league of nations. The Fourteenth 
Points said: “A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants 
for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial 
integrity to great and small states alike.”120  
The Swiss foreign policy elite121 and the Federal Council122 fully understood the 
impact on Switzerland and its neutrality of such a new collective security world order. In 
May 1918, a small committee of experts discussed the possible consequences of such a 
development, and drafted, in an optimistic and pro-active manner, a Swiss proposal for a 
League of Nations covenant.123 That was the start of the recurring idea that Switzerland 
had a special historic international mission because of its centuries-old experience with 
collective security in the confederation.124 
                                                 
119 Graham, The Effect of the League of Nations Covenant, 358. 
120 Francis Paul Walters, A History of the League of Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), 
20. See also Choices for the 21st Century Education Program, Wilson's vision and the League of Nations 
debate. (Providence: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute of International Studies, Brown University, 2004); 
Anique H. M. van Ginneken, Historical dictionary of the League of Nations. (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 
2006). 
121 There is a debate as to whether a foreign policy elite exists in Switzerland. See Chapter II for the 
particularities of the Swiss political system. 
122 The Federal Council or Bundesrat is the Swiss executive power and consists of seven ministers, 
who traditionally represent the major political parties. The presidency rotates every year and has mainly 
symbolic functions. Governmental decisions are taken by consensus and supported by all members of the 
council. 
123 Swiss Federal Council, Message from the Federal Council of Switzerland to the Federal Assembly 
of Switzerland Concerning the Question of the Accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations (4 August 
1919) Together with the Annexes Thereto (Cambridge: University Press, 1919), 4–5. 
124 For a slightly idealistic review of this historical experience, see William E. Rappard, Collective 
Security in Swiss Experience, 1291–1948 (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1948), 150. 
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Swiss hopes for actively influencing the drafting of the covenant were dashed by 
the decision of the Entente Powers to integrate the Covenant into the World War I peace 
treaty, the Treaty of Versailles. The Federal Council was disappointed and stated: “This 
procedure, opposed as it is to the principles of democracy and of the equality of states, 
has furthermore infringed not only the rights of neutrals but also those of some of the 
belligerent states.“125  
Consequently, when Switzerland and other neutral states were invited to comment 
on the draft treaty in March 1919, the delegation insisted that the League should aim for 
universality by allowing the accession of all states, and that the League should respect the 
sovereignty and equality of its members. However, the reality of politics and the fragile 
compromise among the Great Powers did not allow any changes to the draft treaty.126 On 
June 28, 1919, the Covenant of the League of Nations was signed as an integrated part of 
the Peace Treaties of Versailles.127  
The Federal Council clearly pointed to the weaknesses in the final design of the 
League. The League was “unmistakably a compromise,“ and although it tried “to 
comprehend the whole of international life,” it did not solve “the capital problems of 
world-economics.”128 Further, “war remains still recognized as a measure of international 
politics,” and “the League of Nations fails to secure a binding and equitable decision and 
solution of the [international] dispute by an impartial authority.“129 In the message to 
parliament, the Federal Council analyzed in detail the basic tension between “state-
sovereignty and state-independence” and “international solidarity.”130 The compromise 
between these poles is reflected in the fact that the Great Powers were more influential 
than the small states, despite the formal status of equality of all states, and that there was 
 
                                                 
125 Swiss Federal Council, Message from the Federal Council, 6. 
126 Ibid., 8–9. 
127 Walters, A History of the League of Nations, 43–61. 
128 Swiss Federal Council, Message from the Federal Council, 9–10. 
129 Ibid., 13. 
130 Ibid., 14. 
 37
a lack of democracy within the League itself. The Swiss government, however, praised 
the potential benefits that a worldwide collective security organization and world peace 
could bring. 
Regarding neutrality, the Federal Council stated bluntly that neutrality and 
collective security were incompatible. “Neutrality imports the preservation of peace by 
means of non-intervention, while the League of Nations on the other hand aims at 
securing peace by means of solidary action of its member-states.”131 Two articles in the 
Covenant were the source of the problem. Article XX declared that the League’s Council 
had the competence to advise on collective action.132 Article XVI outlined the nature of 
this collective action in the form of sanctions. 
Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its 
covenants … it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of 
war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake 
immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, 
the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals 
of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, 
commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-
breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of 
the League or not.133 
The Swiss government had no doubt that the Swiss people would choose 
neutrality if the question was formulated as “neutrality or the League?”134 Thus, 
Switzerland chose a threefold strategy to circumvent the basic dilemma between 
neutrality and collective security. First, the Federal Council ensured a renewed legal 
recognition of Swiss neutrality. The United States provided the rationale in Article XXI: 
“Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international 
engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe 
                                                 
131 Swiss Federal Council, Message from the Federal Council, 25. 
132 Article XX: “The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external 
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133 Ibid., 51. 
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Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.”135 Then, the French-Swiss negotiation 
about the abrogation of the neutral zone of Savoy provided the opportunity to inject 
Swiss neutrality into the Peace Treaty. In Article 435 of the Paris Peace Treaty, the 
signatory states acknowledged, and reaffirmed, the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland:136 
“The High Contracting Parties, while they recognize the guaranties stipulated by the 
Treaties of 1815, and especially by the Act of November 20, 1815, in favor of 
Switzerland, the said guaranties constituting international obligations for the maintenance 
of peace.”137 Therefore, the Federal Council argued with legalistic logic that Swiss 
neutrality, like the Monroe Doctrine, was consistent with Article XXI of the Covenant. 
Second, in a masterpiece of rhetoric, a clear difference between neutrality policy 
and the laws of neutrality was established. While the laws of neutrality signified the core 
of Swiss neutrality and would be applicable in any case of war, a neutrality policy would 
define peacetime behavior and would leave room for political flexibility.138 This set the 
stage for the logical next step.  
Third, a differential neutrality was proposed to mean that Switzerland would 
support economic sanctions if decided on by the League while remaining militarily 
neutral. The Federal Council was well aware of the extent to which this stretched the 
concept of neutrality in order to square the circle:  
Although we are of opinion that the obligations of neutrality are not so 
extensive as is often maintained, we cannot hide the fact that a rupture, 
fundamental, immediate and universal, of important relations in the 
economic and other areas would be a wholesale departure from the neutral 
policy hitherto followed by us. It would probably bring us to the extreme 
verge of what is compatible with the duties imposed by neutrality.139  
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This was the argument of the Federal Council’s message to the Federal 
Assembly140 on August 4, 1919, concerning the question of accession to the League. In 
the first reading, the parliament linked a possible Swiss accession to the membership in 
the League of the United States. That is, Switzerland would not join the League unless 
the United States did so.141 At the same time, the Entente Powers were not fully 
convinced by the Swiss logic and additional negotiations with the League Council took 
place in London. 
A compromise was achieved thanks to the diplomatic skills of the Swiss 
delegation and the support of friendly states. The London Declaration of February 13, 
1920, is a symbol of how politics outlaws logic and theory. Later, it became equally a 
symbol of how politics in practice cannot match nice rhetoric on paper. Therefore, it is 
worth quoting the declaration at some length: 
The Council of the League of Nations, while affirming that the conception 
of neutrality of the members of the League is incompatible with the 
principle that all members will be obliged to co-operate in enforcing 
respect for their engagements, recognizes that Switzerland is in a unique 
situation, based on a tradition of several centuries which has been 
explicitly incorporated in the Law of Nations….  
The members of the League of Nations are entitled to expect that the 
Swiss people will not stand aside when the high principles of the League 
have to be defended. It is in this sense that the Council of the League has 
taken note of the declaration made by the Swiss Government… and in 
accordance with which Switzerland recognizes and proclaims the duties of 
solidarity which membership of the League of Nations imposes upon her, 
including therein the duty of co-operating in such economic and financial 




                                                 
140 The Federal Assembly consists of the two parliamentary chambers, the National Assembly or 
Nationalrat, representing the people, and the Council of States or Ständerat, representing the 26 cantons. 
141 For further details, including parliamentary votes, see Sergio Stupan, Comment la Suisse a adhéré 
au Pacte de la Société des Nations (Lausanne: Université de Lausanne, 1943), 77ff. 
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In accepting these declarations the Council recognizes that the perpetual 
neutrality of Switzerland and the guaranty of the inviolability of her 
territory as incorporated in the Law of Nations, particularly in the Treaties 
and in the Act of 1815, are justified by the interests of general peace, and 
as such are compatible with the Covenant.142 
Satisfied with this outcome, and after a second reading, the two chambers of the 
Swiss parliament approved the accession of Switzerland to the League and dropped the 
United States membership clause.143 
In the May 16, 1920, referendum, Swiss men approved membership in the League 
with a majority of 56.3 percent. Only around one hundred additional “yes” votes in the 
canton of Appenzell Ausser-Rhoden led to the necessary majority of 11½ out of the 22 
cantons.144 The voter turnout was exceptionally high (77.5 percent).145 This decision 
allowed the ratification of the Covenant, and Switzerland joined the League as a founding 
member. The next sections analyze how this historic decision came about.    
2. External Factors 
As mentioned, World War I was the single most important external factor that 
affected Switzerland’s role in the international system. The only question is the extent to 
which the Swiss response to the new environment in 1918 was externally enforced or 
deliberately chosen. 
World War I caused or accelerated profound legal, economic, social, political, 
technological, and geopolitical changes throughout Europe. The war dealt the deathblow 
to the five-power system and led to the rise of the U.S. and the USSR as major forces in 
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the international system of states. Most of these changes had a direct impact on the 
concept of neutrality and public opinion, and therefore, required an adjustment of Swiss 
foreign policy. R.F. Roxburgh wrote in 1919:  
In twelve days, in the summer of 1914, the political and ethical trappings 
which had been thrown round the conception of neutrality during the 
nineteenth century were torn away from it throughout the greater part of 
Europe. … Neutrality as a maxim of foreign policy has lost its former 
ascendency. … [M]odern war inflicts such hardships on neutrals as to 
make their condition hardly more tolerable than that of states at war, while 
the increased value of neutral support to belligerents, and the greater 
efforts which are made to obtain it, make a policy of neutrality difficult to 
sustain.146 
Besides this decline in the value of neutrality in international law, Switzerland 
faced a new geopolitical situation for several reasons. First, the European balance of 
power system was severely imbalanced in favor of France and Britain. This led to a 
domestic debate about whether Swiss neutrality would still make sense in the perceived 
absence of a balance of power system.147 This development was accompanied by 
growing nationalism. After the breakup of the Habsburg Empire, Switzerland remained a 
multiethnic island in Europe and was exposed to German and Italian irredentism. 
Consequently, the tensions between the German- and French-speaking Swiss had become 
greatly accentuated during the war.  
Second, the war ended Europe’s ability to maintain its own balance of power. The 
main new actor, the United States, brought new views and rules to Europe.  As a 
consequence, Switzerland’s position in the world was no longer exclusively determined 
by the European powers but depended increasingly on the support and the understanding 
of the United States and other non-European states.  
Third, it was the United States and, in particular, Woodrow Wilson, that proposed 
a world order based on solidarity. As noted previously, the concept of collective security 
challenged the foundations of Swiss foreign policy and Swiss identity. Furthermore, the 
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U.S.-driven belief that it was possible to distinguish between the just and the unjust, 
victors and losers, and the good and the bad in international politics would create long-
term conflicts with Switzerland, because it left little or no room for an unbiased type of 
neutrality.148 
The suffering and bloodshed of the war was an ideal seedbed for such a new, 
moral, idealistic approach to international relations. After the war, the maxims of 
Realpolitik temporarily vanished. The next section of this chapter shows that these 
pacifist and idealistic ideas directly affected Swiss public opinion and the Swiss 
government, and caused domestic pressure for a new foreign policy based on 
international solidarity. However, despite the pacifist mood, the Swiss kept their realistic 
feeling for the potential risk of a new war in the center of Europe, where Switzerland 
would again be at the crossroads of the frontlines.149 
Fourth, the Swiss economy was fundamentally transformed in the years preceding 
World War I. Industry and services replaced most of the traditional agrarian economy. In 
1914 Switzerland’s economy was massively dependent on international trade.150 
Consequently, Switzerland realized in World War I that the economic rights of the 
neutrals were impossible to maintain. International security and economic interactions 
were increasingly intertwined; economic sovereignty and independence, in the sense of 
economic autarky, had become a myth.151       
Finally, a two-month deadline to become founding members of the League was 
issued to the countries. This put unusual time pressure on the consensual political system 
of Swiss direct democracy.152 
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In sum, World War I triggered a new form of international cooperation, a 
collective security system in the form of the League of Nations. The Swiss government 
realized early on that this could severely impact Swiss neutrality. Collective security, 
combined with a new geopolitical situation, and time pressure to make a decision 
concerning League membership, allowed the government no other choice than to launch a 
broad debate about Switzerland’s future international role. In contrast to 1945, when 
Swiss membership in the United Nations (UN) was denied by the Allies, in 1918, the 
Swiss were forced to take a position regarding the League. 
3. Internal Factors 
The last section showed that external factors mainly led to the League 
referendum. However, major Swiss foreign policy decisions are always decisively 
influenced and motivated by domestic factors. In 1918, the domestic situation could be 
described by two emotions, “euphoria” and “uncertainty.” There was much euphoria 
about the end of the war and the fact that Switzerland’s territorial integrity was 
maintained. According to Carlo Moos, it was this “basic wave of hope for peace” that led 
to the “mental openness” that later resulted in a successful referendum.153  
Active pacifist movements were established during World War I. According to 
Sergio Stupan, these movements may be categorized into two groups. The first group, the 
Franco-Swiss Freemasons, the Swiss Peace Society, and the Socialists, had an 
“international character” and network. They advocated a leading role for the neutral states 
to end the war and to create a sustainable peace. Although the Socialists had an equal 
international mission and supported the peace activities, they operated within a different 
ideological background and with different long term objectives.154 The second group 
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 Association. They were concerned about maintaining the cohesion of multi-cultural 
Switzerland and recognized that the country’s integrity depended to a significant extent 
on European stability.155 
This is why a broad spectrum of the civil society supported the creation of the 
League at an early stage. Their activities culminated in a petition of the Swiss Peace 
Society to the Federal Council on October 24, 1917, requesting that it “appoint without 
delay an extra-parliamentary commission … to consider and report on the conditions in 
which Switzerland could enter such a federation [as the League of Nations],” that it 
declare its opinion about “the participation of neutral countries in a League of Nations,” 
and that it “summon an international Congress for the establishment of the principles of a 
future League of Nations.”156 
In addition to the euphoria of peace, the war brought uncertainty and political 
unrest. The country struggled to contain the centrifugal forces among the three major 
Swiss cultures. Each linguistic group had its traditional sympathy and bonds with the 
neighbors, France, Germany and Italy. Consequently, the “unfair” peace Treaty of 
Versailles was much criticized among the German-speaking Swiss. 
From 1917 to 1920, the exceptionally stable Swiss political system trembled in 
reaction to the emerging forces of Bolshevism and Socialism. The continued use of the 
armed forces to break worker’s strikes escalated during the “general strike” in 1918, 
when the army killed three workers. The “Landesstreik” was the most severe domestic 
social struggle in the modern history of the country. Only the integration of the Socialists 
into the political system could calm the situation. In the October 26, 1919, election, a 
“turning point in Swiss parliamentary history,” the major political party, the Independent 
Democratic (Radical) Party, lost its absolute majority because of the strengthened 
Socialists and the new Peasants and Artisans Party.157   
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There was also continuity, however. In contrast to the international realm, in 
Switzerland, commitment to the concept of neutrality was reinforced by the outcome of  
the war. There was no intention to question the basic concept of Swiss neutrality. On the 
contrary, the domestic tensions buttressed the practical and symbolic role of Swiss 
neutrality for national identity.158 
In sum, the domestic factor played an important role in the League debate. It was 
an active civil society that preceded and championed governmental League policies. 
Furthermore, a severe internal crisis accompanied the League debate. However, the 
following analysis of the “yes“ and “no” campaigns shows that the League referendum 
was foremost a foreign policy debate and was not reduced to domestic political “turf” 
wars.   
4. The “Yes” Campaign 
The Swiss League membership supporters organized themselves on November 3, 
1919. The association saw itself in a supportive role for the Federal Council.159 The 
committee had broad support from major political parties,160 with the exception of the 
Socialists, and from civil associations, such as the Grütliverein, the New Helvetic 
Association, the Swiss Peace Association, the Associations of Swiss Liberals, and maybe 
most important, the Swiss Farmers League.161 
The pro-committee generally followed the intellectual arguments of the Federal 
Council. However, in the final effort to reach voters, the Federal Council used unusually 
clear language by stating that  
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A decision of the people against the league would bring with it irreparable 
damage to the prosperity of Switzerland, to the unity of the country, and to 
the respect it enjoys abroad. It would involve the gravest danger to our 
commerce, our industry, and our agriculture. The League of Nations will 
gradually unite all the states of the world. …Switzerland cannot refuse her 
coöperation when humanity undertakes by a broadly devised plan to bring 
justice and peace to the world.162   
According to Carlo Moos, the supportive arguments could be characterized by 
two keywords, “dawn” (Aufbruch) and “essence of Switzerland” (Wesen der Schweiz). 
The “yes” campaign was guided by the optimistic belief that the League would bring 
peace, a new world order, and economic advantages. Despite its imperfect nature, the 
League was described as having the potential to fulfill its mission.163 This optimism and 
the expression of hope were reflected in a message from the Federal Council stating that 
the League would be “the supersession of the idea hitherto dominant, of state egoism—
each for himself—by the new idea of international solidarity—all for each.”164 Most 
important, there was hope that the new world order would be based on the rule of 
international law, which is a traditional cornerstone of Swiss foreign policy, influenced 
by the legalistic tradition of neutrality. “The League must become the centre of the whole 
of international life so far as that can be envisaged from the standpoint of right.”165 
The second line of argumentation, “the essence of Switzerland,” was based on the 
belief that the country, with its rich multi-ethnic, democratic and federal experience, 
could serve as an international example and that it had the historic duty and mission to do 
so. Switzerland was described as a mini-League of Nations, “a micro-cosmos of 
international relations,” and proponents of accession argued that the League could be 
seen as the further development of the basic ideas of Swiss state-building.166       
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These idealistic arguments were in the foreground; nevertheless, economic 
arguments are always of special importance in Swiss referendum campaigns. The League 
was no exception. Representatives of trade, industry and agriculture pointed to the 
dependence of the Swiss economy on exports. They stressed that membership in the 
League would be necessary to avoid economic isolation.167 Although the Covenant did 
not provide many direct regulations concerning the world economy, except for 
international labor legislation, there was a widespread feeling that such a collective 
security organization could not maintain peace in the long term without organizing 
international economic life.168   
The pro-committee successfully tailored the campaign to specific target 
audiences. The main focus was on the conservative Catholic cantons and the rural 
population. There was an appeal to the Catholic population that it was a Christian duty to 
express solidarity for an organization that would bring peace to the world. Even more 
important was Ernst Laur, the leader of the Swiss Farmers League, who translated the 
rational arguments into positive emotional ones, which were well received by the rural 
population. In figurative language, he insisted on the economic advantages of League 
membership and declared that Switzerland, “the oldest league of nations on earth,” 
should lead the international efforts to create “peace on earth.”169           
The “yes” committee understood that neutrality would play a crucial role. The 
main argument went along the lines of the governmental rhetoric. The campaign 
described neutrality and solidarity as equal and complementary policies. At the same 
time, the League supporters pointed to the decline of neutrality as a security provider, 
mainly because economic neutrality was impossible during World War I.170 Finally, the 
campaign, and especially the political left, placed into question the usefulness of 
neutrality in general. In sum, the campaign held that neutrality should be seen as a means 
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 to an end. History could no longer give guidance when the international environment had 
fundamentally changed. Therefore, neutrality had to adjust itself to the new international 
environment, which meant differential neutrality.171  
The “yes” campaign, for good reasons, did not pinpoint the theoretical fallacies of 
differential neutrality. Even among League supporters, the practicality of economic 
sanctions was questioned. There was nonetheless an unspoken consensus among both 
supporters and opponents of Swiss membership in the League that, as the Swiss 
experience with the Entente’s blockade in World War I had shown, economic neutrality 
was, in practice, difficult or impossible to maintain.172 However, there were only a few 
League supporters, mainly Socialists, who proposed a radical change in policy and the 
abandonment of neutrality.173  
In sum, the pro-committee had a broad base of supporters and successfully 
transmitted the well-prepared arguments of the Federal Council to the critical target 
audiences. International and economic arguments were adroitly mixed with the historic 
role of Switzerland. Neutrality was not the most important aspect of the debate because 
the basic question as to whether neutrality was compatible with collective security had 
already been solved in advance by the diplomatic efforts of the Federal Council. 
5. The “No” Campaign 
The contra-committee could not organize itself in a similar cohesive manner. The 
opponents were scattered among the Blshevist hardliners of the Socialists, the divided 
Catholic Conservatives in the German-speaking cantons, the small group of right-wing 
nationalists, and part of the army’s senior leadership, spearheaded by former World War I 
general Ulrich Wille.174 
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Carlo Moos organizes the opposing arguments along two lines. The first one can 
be titled “defense,“ and the second “Finis Helvetiae.”175 In a defensive battle against new 
ideas, the opponents argued that the League was only an idealistic construct, which had 
grown out of a “peace psychosis,” and that the implementation of the Covenant of the 
League would be impossible.176 At the other end of this political spectrum, the Socialists 
saw the League “as a new form of imperialism and colonialism and an instrument of 
capital.”177      
Neglecting the collective security idea, opponents continuously called the League 
of Nations the “League of Versailles” and depicted it as an instrument of the balance of 
power managed by the victors of World War I, especially France. This argument was 
nurtured by the cultural sympathy for Germany in the German-speaking parts of 
Switzerland and by the failure of the United States to participate in the League.178 Many 
German-speaking Swiss felt that it was unfair not to accept Germany into the League.179 
The opponents of Swiss accession to the League used the national historical 
narrative, which claimed that neutrality, independence and sovereignty were the pillars of 
Swiss identity, by arguing that Article XVI of the Covenant would undermine all 
three.180 The pragmatic version of the argument acknowledged a change in the 
international system but concluded that Switzerland would have to give up some 
sovereignty anyway, regardless of whether the country were to stay outside the League. 
Therefore, “wait and see” would be the best strategy.181 
The more emotional and fundamental version of the argument claimed that 
League membership was an existential question for the Swiss future, an “all or nothing” 
decision. Here, neutrality was the most important word. It was because of neutrality that 
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Switzerland existed and had survived previous European struggles. Therefore, any 
change in neutrality policy would inevitably lead to “Finis Helvetiae.”182 The differential 
neutrality in the London Declaration was described as an “artificial construct” that could 
not be maintained in reality.183 Differential neutrality, particularly participation in 
economic sanctions, would “be a despicable kind of ‘hunger warfare,’ certain to lead to 
military reprisals by the aggrieved state and probably to the invasion of Switzerland and 
the seizure of Geneva as the capital of the league.”184  
The “no” campaign insisted that neutrality was absolutely necessary for the 
cohesion of the three Swiss cultures and the Swiss national identity. The enormous 
internal tensions, especially between the French- and German-speaking Swiss during 
World War I, were used as the most prominent evidence.185 
Solidarity was not part of the vocabulary of the League’s opponents. To the 
contrary, they stipulated that solidarity was only a cover for returning to international 
political ambitions or serving as a “fig leaf” for bandwagoning with the great powers. 
Staying outside of the League would only enhance Switzerland’s “moral power.”186     
Finally, from an analytical military point of view, the League was not perceived 
as a major problem. However, a small part of the military leadership saw the Geneva seat 
as a threat to military neutrality. The Federal Council defused this argument by obtaining 
a guarantee from the League that there would be no preparations for military action 
conducted on Swiss territory, including the Geneva area.187 
In sum, the opponents of League membership did not believe in a system of 
collective security. Consequently, they denied the possibility and the necessity to 
differentiate between the laws of neutrality and neutrality policy, and they saw no 
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rationality behind the concept of differential neutrality. Instead, they diabolized the new 
organization as a major threat to the country’s very existence and proposed a defensive 
policy based on traditional Swiss values. At the end, the weak and dispersed “no” 
campaign was not able to convince a majority of the population that there was no hope 
for a new world order or that the changed international system would not require an 
adjusted foreign policy.188 Furthermore, the opponents could not fully exploit the 
neutrality argument because military neutrality was never put into question and because 
differential neutrality remained a concept on paper for the time being. 
6. Summary 
This first part of the chapter showed that external factors, namely euphoria after 
the armistice, an altered geopolitical balance, and the creation of a collective security 
organization, called for a major decision in Swiss foreign policy. The question was 
whether to join the League or not. These international factors fell on fertile domestic soil. 
Civil society organizations, politicized by the social upheavals of that time, pushed the 
Federal Council into an active and supportive role. The result was a thoughtful neutrality 
conception that was ostensibly compatible with collective security and backed up by 
international guarantees. 
The importance of the concept of differential neutrality for the successful outcome 
of the referendum cannot be underestimated. Carlo Moos is right in stating that the 
London Declaration “played an important and maybe decisive role.”189 The Federal 
Council knew that, despite the international decline of neutrality during the war, the 
security and identity functions of Swiss neutrality were revitalized by World War I, and 
that it would have been impossible to put Switzerland’s military neutrality into 
question.190 
Based on this sound foundation, the referendum campaign debated questions 
about the character and effectiveness of the League, the historical role and duty of 
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Switzerland, the potential economic gains, the practicality of differential neutrality, and 
the impact of collective security on national cohesion and identity.  
In contrast to the UN membership debate in 1945, Switzerland joined the League 
not because it had no other choice but because it had one. Viktor Vögelin concludes that 
the Swiss public decided for the sake of “an open foreign policy based on clear 
principles,” which supported “domestic political stability,” and less for economic or 
idealistic reasons.191 Carlo Moos summarizes that “a positive general environment, which 
supported openness, and firm leadership,” made the slim majority possible.192 
The decision to join the first modern collective security organization was based on 
theory, not on experience. How would theory meet practice? 
C. DIFFERENTIAL NEUTRALITY FROM 1920 TO 1938 
1. Introduction 
This short section analyzes how the League itself, as well as Switzerland’s 
membership and its concept of differential neutrality, were implemented. The high 
expectations, optimism, and idealism of the new collective security organization were 
quickly challenged by the harsh reality of the interwar period. 
However, before practice can be discussed, a quick theoretical overview is 
necessary. In 1927, Malbone W. Graham analyzed the effects of the Covenant on the 
theory and practice of neutrality and pointed to two issues: the question whether war was 
still legally possible and the question of the nature of sanctions. Graham concluded that 
the League did not totally ban war. There were at least three legal possibilities to conduct 
war, and consequently, there would be cases in which traditional neutrality was 
applicable.193  
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Regarding sanctions, there were three important viewpoints. The first, according 
to Graham, was “born out of the psychology of war.” This was the original Wilsonian 
idea that every nation that broke the Covenant was automatically at war with the rest of 
the world or at least with all members of the League. The second view, which grew out of 
the immediate postwar period, and which was Switzerland’s temporary view, believed 
that sanctions “– rupture of diplomatic relations, non-intercourse, economic blockade and 
military pressure – would be … compatible with the maintenance of neutrality.” The final 
and fundamental new view, which emerged in the second half of the 1920s, linked 
sanctions with preventive, or punitive, interventions “whenever the peace of the world is 
jeopardized.”194 
After the foundation of the League, the organization itself and the handling of war 
and neutrality quickly veered away from the initial concepts.        
2. The League of Nations 
The life of the League is characterized by two phases. In the first phase, until the 
second half of the 1920s, the organization grew in strength and scope. In the second 
phase, the League quickly became irrelevant because of its inability to manage the 
deteriorating international situation after the start of the world depression in 1929. The 
League had most of its success in “the execution of the peace treaties,” or in modern 
terms, in post-conflict activities.195 Despite these initial successes, the League lacked 
from the outset the universality and rigidity necessary to fulfill its core task: to maintain 
peace by pre-conflict action. 
In 1926, when Germany joined, the League had 54 member states. In the 
following years, more states left the League than new ones joined, and after 1937, the 
League constantly lost members. 
The decision of the United States Senate not to give its advise and to consent to 
ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, and therefore, not to join the League, was a 
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serious blow to the overall concept. William Rappard wrote that “Without America, the 
League remains an association of nations that one may join or leave at one’s discretion, 
whose corporate solidarity is feeble and whose uncertain collective will may be 
disregarded with impunity, at least by any of its principal members.”196 Hence, “from the 
very beginning the League was forced to recognize an international reality beyond its 
control and to accept the neutrality of its own members with regards to wars between 
non-member states.”197 The 1921 Greco-Turkish war and the 1933 Chaco war were 
examples. 
Furthermore, by October 1921, the Assembly of the League “de facto, neutralized 
the elements of compulsion and automatism of Article XVI of the Covenant by leaving 
the decision as to the adoption of sanctions to the discretion of the various member-
states.”198  
In the view of Efraim Karsh, and this is consistent with the previously cited 
argument of Graham regarding the theory of intervention, the League failed to become a 
universal collective security organization and degenerated into an instrument of great 
power politics. Karsh summarizes “that the League was never an international but only a 
multinational body; [and] that it was not motivated by a sincere desire to direct 
international relations in a universal spirit, but rather served as the tool of the Great 
Powers in the furtherance of their interests.”199 In the mid-1930s, in the face of the desire 
by leading revisionist powers to alter the system of the Paris suburban treaties, it seemed 
that most of the arguments of the Swiss League opponents had become reality. 
3. Switzerland’s Role in the League of Nations  
Switzerland’s role in the League was characterized by two poles: on one hand, 
new international membership duties, and on the other, the safeguarding of its 
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neutrality.200 Regarding its duties, Switzerland had three lines of action. First, it 
supported efforts that the League become a truly universal organization. Second, it 
supported all activities that led to the strengthening of international law.201 Third, the 
country expressed its solidarity by offering good offices to the League. Swiss diplomats 
were active in the League’s mediation activities in the border conflict of Upper Silesia, 
the Saar plebiscite in 1935, and the free city of Danzig.202  
A major advantage for Switzerland was the Geneva seat of the League, which 
brought prestige to the country and facilitated bilateral contacts. Switzerland could rely 
on the support of friendly countries, a fact that helped in policy areas where Switzerland 
was less cooperative. However, these symbolic gestures of solidarity could not hide the 
fact that the Swiss government, in response to public and parliamentary opinion, 
increasingly adopted a defensive role in the League.203   
4. Switzerland’s Differential Neutrality 
Max Huber, the main author of the excellent message of the Federal Council to 
the Federal Assembly regarding Swiss accession to the League,204 invented the idea of 
separating the economic and political sphere of neutrality from the legal and military 
sphere. This was the basis of the concept of differential neutrality.  
Differential neutrality not only distinguished between military neutrality and 
economic sanctions, but also between neutrality in the case of a collective security action 
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of the League and other cases of war. The core of military neutrality was recognized in 
the 1920 London Declaration by the Council of the League of Nations: 
[Switzerland] is prepared to make every sacrifice to defend her own 
territory under every circumstance, even during operations undertaken by 
the League of Nations, but will not be obliged to take part in any military 
action or to allow the passage of foreign troops or the preparation of 
military operations within her territory.205 
The government consistently implemented this policy. In 1921, it refused to 
permit the transit of French troops to supervise an eventual plebiscite in Vilnius. 
Similarly, in 1935, Italian troops could not cross Swiss territory for a League task, to 
supervise the Saar plebiscite.206 While Switzerland maintained a firm line with the 
League regarding its military neutrality, it was never challenged by economic sanctions. 
It was not until 1935 and the Italian invasion of Ethiopia that differential neutrality had its 
first real test, and the next section is the story of its failure. 
D. THE RETURN TO TRADITIONAL NEUTRALITY IN 1938 
1. Introduction  
I believe that, even viewed in the perspective of centuries, the last ten 
years will be characterized by the future historian as an epoch of 
extraordinarily numerous and radical changes.  
—William E. Rappard, August 8, 1927.207 
The litmus test for the League and differential neutrality was the Italian-
Abyssinian war in 1935–1936. On October 2, 1935, Italy invaded Abyssinia. On October 
9, by a majority of 50 of 53 delegations, the League’s Assembly decided to implement 
economic sanctions against Italy.208 
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Switzerland declared its military neutrality consistent with the London 
Declaration. However, “its attempts to balance its neutrality with a demonstration of 
international solidarity, …resulted in an amalgamated Swiss response encompassing only 
partial adherence to each of its sets of responsibilities.”209 Thus, the Swiss government 
made it clear that, for domestic reasons, it would be impossible to fully implement the 
sanctions. Further, to the surprise of many League members, and in line with The Hague 
Conventions of 1907, Switzerland imposed an arms embargo on Ethiopia.210 For its 
economic policy, it applied the concept of courant normale, which meant that the 
bilateral amount of trade with Italy and Ethiopia was fixed at the level of the previous 
year.211  
The protocols of the League negotiations regarding the sanctions against Italy 
revealed Switzerland’s difficulty in justifying its non-commitment policy. In 1935, the 
Federal Council stated that sanctions against Italy would be impossible, because of 
economic and domestic political reasons. In plain language, for a confederation, it was 
infeasible to interrupt the Kingdom of Italy’s close economic and social relations with the 
Italian-speaking populations in the cantons neighboring Italy.212 Later on, the Federal 
Council used weak legal arguments concerning the law of neutrality to justify its 
economic policy. When several countries, afraid of setting a precedent, challenged the 
Swiss view and argued that the Swiss behavior was unacceptable and not within the terms 
of the London Declaration, the Federal Council declared that as a sovereign country, 
Switzerland would not be bound by any law or body, when it had to take decisions to 
protect its vital national interests.213 
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The economic sanctions were largely ineffective, mainly because of two non-
members, Germany and the United States.214 An internal report concluded that twenty-
five percent of the League’s members did not put the sanctions into practice.215 In June 
1936 the League gave up and gradually lifted the sanctions against Italy. Italy nonetheless 
left the League in 1937.  
The consequences of the Abyssinia disaster were immediate. It “led to the sudden 
resurrection of traditional neutrality to an even greater extent than before World War I” 
by all former neutral European states.216 On July 1, 1936, Denmark, Finland, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland issued the “Declaration of the 
Seven” and de facto cancelled their obligations under Article XVI of the Covenant.217 In 
January 1938, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland “declared that in their opinion 
the provisions of Article 16 had no longer any binding force.”218 Within a year, all 
former neutral states declared their return to traditional neutrality.    
In April 1938, amid the Nazi German annexation of Austria, the Federal Council 
declared to the League Council that: “At the present day, the distinction between military 
and economic sanctions would prove illusory so far as Switzerland was concerned. If she 
resorted to economic pressure, she would be in grave danger of being treated exactly as if 
she had taken military action.”219 On May 14, 1938, the League Council responded: 
The Council of the League of Nations … takes note that Switzerland, 
invoking her perpetual neutrality, had expressed the intention not to 
participate any longer in any manner in the putting into operation of the 
provisions of the Covenant relating to sanctions and declares that she will 
not be invited to do so.220  
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This was the death certificate of Switzerland’s differential neutrality and marked, 
according to Hans Morgenthau, “the collapse of the basic principle for which the League 
stands.”221 
2. External Factors 
The decline of the League in the view of the Swiss did not start in 1936, but much 
earlier. The Federal Council and the supporters of the League knew how important in the 
long term the universality of the organization would be. In 1919, the Federal Council 
concluded that:  
We count with greater assurance, however, on the development of the 
present League at no distant date into a universal League. If this does not 
happen, it seems almost inevitable that the forces of dissolution will 
sooner or later begin to work within it itself.222  
The rejection of the League by the United States was a severe blow to the 
credibility of the League supporters, who had asked, with an eye on the United States, 
how Switzerland, “the great exponent of the democratic and republican principle, 
especially in Europe,”223 would be judged “if, at a great crisis in history, out of faintness 
of heart or skepticism or self-seeking, we had forborne to champion a cause, which from 
the wider outlook, is the cause of Humanity, and from the narrower, the further 
development of our own political thought.”224 After such idealistic and heroic words, the 
disillusion by reality was great. In the view of many, the absence of the United States was 
the end of the League’s universality from a moral viewpoint. From a geopolitical 
perspective, the League’s universality collapsed when Germany and Japan (both in 1933) 
and finally Italy (1937) withdrew.   
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These events were paralleled by a global transformation of the concept of 
neutrality. Driven by the neutrality legislation of the United States from 1935 to 1937, 
“the ‘new’ neutrality was characterized by the insistence, not on the neutral rights, but on 
neutral duties.” Furthermore, the international handling of the Spanish Civil War invented 
a new “twilight zone between belligerency and neutrality.”225 
The perceived failure of the League went hand in hand with the deteriorating 
international security situation. In 1931, with “Japan’s invasion of Manchuria the illusion 
of ‘collective security’ broke down in Asia, South America and Africa” and the failed 
sanctions against Italy, the Locarno Pact, and Germany’s reoccupation of the Rhineland 
in March 1936 sealed the end of collective security in Europe.226 
In addition, European protectionism in response to the Great Depression had 
severe negative impacts on Switzerland’s liberal free-trade economy, and the country 
went through a long economic downturn in the 1930s.227  
Finally, the emergence of Fascism, and especially Germany’s annexation of 
Austria in March 1938, created intense domestic pressure for a return to traditional 
neutrality.228 With the sanctions debate in mind, it is important to recall that Mussolini 
declared in 1921 that the Italian-speaking parts of Switzerland should belong to Italy, and 
that in 1934 this became an official aim of Italian foreign policy.229    
3. Internal Factors 
With typical Swiss caution, the Federal Council had by 1919 formulated a clear 
idea for a fall-back plan. The Council’s message stated that Switzerland “would, 
therefore, if … the League of Nations should be unable to maintain itself, be able to 
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return again to her traditional attitude,”230 which would be traditional, integral neutrality. 
With the same thought in mind, the opponents of Swiss membership in the League 
referendum in 1919 did not disappear after their defeat. Instead, in 1921, they founded the 
“Public League for Swiss Independence” with the aim of codifying integral neutrality in 
the Swiss Constitution.231  
In conjunction with this domestic pressure, as noted previously, Switzerland, 
together with other small European states, actively tried to dilute the obligations of 
Article XVI of the Covenant.232 It can be deduced from the debate in 1920 that neither 
the Swiss government nor the public wholeheartedly accepted or understood Article XVI 
as the core of a collective security system. After the experiences with the sanctions 
against Italy, Switzerland aimed for a de facto traditional neutrality without having to 
leave the League.   
Finally, the sanctions against Italy in 1935 showed that the idea of differential 
neutrality was impossible to implement. Italy was not only an emerging and totalitarian 
Great Power; it was also one of Switzerland’s most important trade partners.233 In this 
light, it is not surprising that, in a U-turn from its vote in 1920, the Italian-speaking 
canton of Ticino became one of the strongest opponents of the League and its sanctions.   
4. Domestic Debate 
The basic arguments against the League need not be repeated. In 1936, the 
starting position was settled. In the words of Hans Morgenthau, the sanctions against Italy 
“showed the small European states that the risk resulting from the system of collective 
security was not compensated for by any strengthening of their own security.”234 Walter 
Zahler summarized the dilemma as follows: “To distinguish between situations in which 
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one should be neutral and situations in which one should not be neutral is the negation of 
neutrality. A state cannot be partially neutral.”235 
In quick steps, the Federal Council returned to traditional neutrality. Federal 
Councilor Giuseppe Motta publicly launched the idea in the summer of 1937. This was 
mirrored by the announcement of a popular initiative stating that “the well-tested 
unrestricted neutrality is to be reestablished, excluding Switzerland’s participation in any 
international compulsory measures.”236 In contrast to 1920, in 1935 the French—and 
Italian-speaking populations—were united with the German-Swiss population in their 
opposition to differential neutrality.237 In its declaration to the League in April 1938, the 
Federal Council stated that the return to traditional neutrality was “supported by the 
massive determination of the Federal Assembly and the Swiss population.”238 
However, this was not entirely true. Since the Soviet Union had joined the League 
in 1934, the Swiss Socialists and Communists supported differential neutrality with the 
argument that the return to traditional neutrality would only strengthen the Fascist Axis 
Powers.239 Furthermore, there was a minority that had open sympathies for Italy and its 
actions. According to John Roos, Switzerland acted much in favor of Italy after 1936, and 
it was only because of pressure from the population that the government took a more 
neutral position.240  
5. Summary 
When William Rappard stated in 1927 that the last decade had been one of 
fundamental change, he probably had no idea of how much more the international system 
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would change in the years leading up to World War II. The world economic crisis, 
Fascism, nationalism and irredentism shaped the international agenda in the interwar 
period. The result was an increasingly dysfunctional and helpless League of Nations.  
Soon after the successful referendum in 1920, the fragile Swiss majority for a 
differential neutrality in favor of collective security collapsed together with idealistic, 
optimistic visions and the pacifist movements. When Switzerland was called upon to 
express its international solidarity, it reacted as it had done for centuries. In other words, 
“national self-interest largely conditioned” its behavior.241 Facing a united domestic 
front, the government had no choice other than to return to traditional neutrality. 
In addition, differential neutrality was a classic case of the basic dilemma between 
theory and practice, between words and deeds. Hans Morgenthau was correct in stating 
that “Ingeniously contrived legal clauses, as far as they do not reflect real political 
decisions, can at best create the illusion of solving a political problem.” Swiss differential 
neutrality was exactly such a legalistic construct that failed with the first test.242  
There are two key legacies from the failed League of Nations experiment and 
Switzerland’s return to traditional neutrality. First, collective security was now perceived 
as a failed concept for organizing the international system, and even more important, 
participation in a collective security organization seemed to pose greater risks to 
Switzerland than non-participation. 
Second, the failure of differential neutrality was not attributed to the 
imperfections of the League, but to the impossibility of implementing the concept itself. 
This led to the fundamental rejection of any future ideas of differential neutrality. The 
return to integral neutrality and the lack of any alternative rhetoric, coupled with the 
experience of World War II, prevented the revival of differential neutrality in the debate 
about UN membership.243  
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E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter analyzed how the Swiss people, in a historically unprecedented 
decision, abandoned their traditional neutrality and joined the League of Nations. This 
result was only possible because a visionary leadership could mobilize a politicized 
society with an adroit argumentation that matched the Zeitgeist, and that provided a 
solution to the “neutrality—collective security dilemma” in form of the newly invented 
concept of differential neutrality. The quick closure of this historic window of 
opportunity and, consequently, the sudden return to old positions offered evidence of the 
singularity of the League decision.   
If the referendum of 1920 provided evidence that the Swiss people are in principle 
willing to sacrifice their integral neutrality, the situation in 1938 furnished proof that they 
are only willing to do so if there is a truly universal, unified, and strong collective 
security organization in place. Because the initial experiment of collective security failed, 
it became much more difficult to convince the public of the usefulness of the concept. 
The next chapter of this thesis suggests that the successful 2002 Swiss referendum on 
participation in the United Nations cannot serve as evidence that this view has changed 
significantly. 
The intense debate about the future character of Swiss neutrality in relation to a 
collective security system had deep implications for the understanding of neutrality 
throughout the twentieth century. In 1920, the Federal Council and the supporters of 
Swiss accession to the League convinced the public that a compromise or compatibility 
between neutrality and collective security was possible, at least in theory. In doing so, 
they moved the concept of neutrality away from the legal and military core of the laws of 
neutrality, to the formulation of a neutrality policy and the creation of the concept of 
differential neutrality. Despite the failure of the concept of differential neutrality in the 
interwar period, the League discourse created the foundation for a flexible and Janus-like 
neutrality concept and enhanced the toolbox of Swiss foreign policy. However, this 
legacy was only revitalized after the end of the Cold War, and by avoiding the discredited 
name of differential neutrality. In the meantime, the failure of differential neutrality and 
the experiences in World War II led to a dogmatic, inflexible neutrality concept. 
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Finally, the findings of this chapter only partially support three basic hypotheses 
of this study. First, the League of Nations case study did not provide clear evidence for 
the hypothesis that the country joined a collective security system with the intention to 
compensate for the decline of the national security function of neutrality by emphasizing 
solidarity. In 1920, for the Swiss public, the security function of neutrality was 
uncontested. It appears that it was a sincere idealistic hope and belief in a new system that 
mobilized a majority of the Swiss people to support accession to the League. The League 
experience was probably the historic origin of seeing international solidarity and the 
security function of neutrality as complementary. 
Second, the chapter reviewed some evidence that the national identity function of 
neutrality was an important factor in the League of Nations era.244 The symbolic value of 
neutrality for Switzerland’s cohesion was stressed throughout the interwar period and 
reinforced by the ideological and physical threats to Switzerland during World War I, the 
interwar period, and during and after World War II. This is why in the case of 
Switzerland, the concepts of sovereignty, independence and neutrality are almost 
interchangeable. The failure of differential neutrality is also strong evidence for the idea 
that economic interests have a decisive impact on Swiss foreign policy decisions. 
Third, the hypothesis that Switzerland joined the League because the security 
function of neutrality appeared to be in relative decline was only partially supported by 
the evidence reviewed in this chapter. There is strong evidence that the peace after World 
War I and the resulting peace euphoria were the most important factors for a successful 
League referendum. However, it seems that perceived threats and objective geopolitical 
constellations are not always in congruence and that they have different impacts on the 
security function of neutrality. 
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The following chapter discusses Switzerland’s relationship with the UN. Among 
other factors, Switzerland’s initial decision not to join the new attempt to establish a 
functioning universal collective security organization was much influenced by the 
“unsatisfactory experience as a member of the League of Nations.”245 
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IV. SWISS NEUTRALITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Switzerland joined the United Nations (UN) in 2002 as the 190th member state. It 
was fifty-seven years after this collective security organization was founded, and sixty-
four years after Switzerland had returned to its traditional permanent neutrality by 
severing its solidarity obligations to the League of Nations. This chapter examines the 
domestic and international factors that help to explain Swiss accession to the UN. In 
doing so, it emphasizes the critical role of Swiss neutrality. The chapter focuses on two 
referendums, the public’s rejection of joining the UN in 1986 and its consent to 
membership in 2002. 
The Swiss–UN relationship is unique, because Switzerland was the only neutral 
country to stay outside the organization during the entire Cold War. A comparison of the 
referendums is revealing, because the “yes” vote in 2002 contrasted sharply with the 
massive “no” vote in 1986. The interpretation of neutrality was a major issue in both 
campaigns and influenced to a large extent the results. Surprisingly, public support for 
neutrality has remained at a consistently high level throughout the decades.246 Therefore, 
the logical conclusion is that the Swiss have changed their idea of neutrality. What, then, 
explains the U-turn in public opinion regarding UN membership and Swiss neutrality?  
To what extent was it due to external factors, such as the end of the Cold War? To what 
extent was it due to internal factors, such as changes in domestic politics? The answers to 
these questions clarify how the concept and the public perception of Swiss neutrality have 
evolved. 
This chapter suggests that Switzerland did not join the UN until 2002 because the 
government was unable until then to convince the population that the self-imposed post-
World War II axiom of an inflexible neutrality doctrine, which was incompatible with 
collective security, had slowly changed during the Cold War. The official rhetoric of 
                                                 
246 In 1989, 89 percent of the Swiss supported neutrality, in 2009, 93 percent. See Tresch and others, 
Sicherheit 2009, 122. 
 68
“neutrality and solidarity,” with a flexible neutrality policy in practice, had no impact 
until the fundamental changes of 1989–1991 and their consequences on Switzerland 
removed the mental blockade. In contrast to the League of Nations, and maybe because 
of the League experience, it took more than half a century to reconstruct the traditional 
concept of neutrality by filling it with a “new” yet old meaning—differential neutrality. 
This change and the successful referendum in 2002 were possible because of the relative 
decline of neutrality as a security provider, the revitalization of collective security in the 
1990s, and, in conjunction with a general fear of isolation, a new “openness” to 
international cooperation. The fusion of neutrality and solidarity in the same concept, 
however, remains fragile in practice, because of the paramount function of neutrality in 
Swiss national identity. For the same reason, and because of the ineffectual character of 
the UN, Switzerland’s membership in the organization cannot be interpreted as a historic 
shift from neutrality to collective security. 
Every attempt to structure the history of Swiss neutrality and its relationship to 
collective security organizations is to some extent arbitrary.247 Several factors, including 
world events, changes in neutrality policy, the transformation of the UN, and 
increasingly, the European integration movement, interacted and overlapped; and this 
makes it difficult to define distinct historical periods. This chapter’s analysis of the 
Swiss-UN relationship is nonetheless organized in four parts. The first discusses the 
period from 1945 to 1948, when neutrality hit a low mark. The second part discusses a 
phase that lasted until the mid-1960s, when neutrality regained some status during the 
Cold War. Two sections then analyze the referendums in 1986 and 2002 and the time 
period leading to these events. 
B. SWISS NEUTRALITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS, 1945–1948 
The events from 1945 to 1948 were crucial for Switzerland’s absence from the 
UN until 2002. The two referendums can only be understood with the background of four 
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decades of steady rapprochement to the UN and a gradual change in Switzerland’s 
dogmatic neutrality concept, which, and this is the point of this section, was rooted in the 
immediate post-war years. 
From an international political perspective, after World War II, neutrality was a 
dead letter. Belligerents on both sides had disregarded and badly violated, in the 
European theatre, the neutrality of Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, and Norway.248 The remaining neutral countries, mainly Ireland, Sweden, 
and Switzerland, “maintained neutrality but at the price of considerable material and 
political concessions to the belligerents, and most often compromising themselves in their 
dealings with Nazi Germany.”249 From a narrower legal perspective, the law of neutrality 
in World War II completely failed. While Switzerland insisted on its traditional 
permanent neutrality, protected by international law, most of the other neutral countries 
drifted to a position of non-belligerency. The most prominent examples were the United 
States (until December 1941), Spain and Turkey.250 
In 1945, Switzerland was more isolated than ever. The Allies claimed that 
Switzerland’s neutrality had been immoral, selfish and egoistic and had only supported 
the Axis powers. This contrasted sharply with the Swiss public’s view that they had 
suffered during the war and had resisted Nazi Germany in order to keep the country and 
its strategic territory independent.251 The United States immediately put significant 
pressure on the country by blocking its financial accounts and by requesting that all 
German assets in Switzerland be used for reparation payments.  
Because Switzerland had refused to declare war on Germany, in 1945 it “had 
neither the right nor the desire to attend the San Francisco gathering of anti-Axis 
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belligerents, all the more since the hostilities were still in progress.”252 The Federal 
Council, however, in April 1945 tasked a group of Swiss foreign policy experts to 
analyze the consequences of the San Francisco conference. The debate echoed the 
theoretical considerations during the League of Nations period.253 The experts concluded 
that the UN did not represent a true collective security system because not all members 
had the same standing and rights.254 Former advocates of the League of Nations, such as 
William Rappard, took an especially critical, and to some extent, defiant position. In 
1946, he summarized his view, which was widely supported, by writing that the UN, in 
contrast to what is written in the Charter, “is not based on the principle of the ‘sovereign 
equality’ of its members” but is “a true international aristocracy” of the Big Five. The 
Swiss continued to have the will “to be subjected to no foreign masters, to take orders 
from no authority in which one is not represented.”255 Despite these counter-arguments, 
the commission in 1945 recommended Swiss accession to the new organization, if, and 
this is the key caveat, Switzerland could remain permanently neutral. This 
recommendation reflected the political realities and the almost unanimous support for 
permanent neutrality in the population.256  
Thus, the Federal Council explored the possibility of gaining again a special status 
as a neutral state, similar to that defined in the League of Nations London declaration. 
But, the protocols from San Francisco left no doubt that the victorious Powers, and 
especially France and Belgium, saw permanent neutrality as incompatible with the UN 
Charter.257 This pronounced anti-neutral view persisted in the early years of the UN. In 
1946, the first Secretary General, Trygve Lie, stated concerning Switzerland that 
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“Neutrality is a word I cannot find in the Charter.”258 The Federal Council decided, 
because of this negative environment, that instead of seeking membership, Switzerland 
would monitor the development of the UN, accede to the technical UN sub-organizations, 
and facilitate the establishment and operation of UN offices in Switzerland, especially in 
Geneva.259 
The academic literature agrees that this policy decision, referred to as a doctrine 
of “neutrality and solidarity,” dominated the Swiss–UN relationship during the Cold War. 
According to Daniel Möckli, this decision was driven by the absence of external coercion 
and the internal unwillingness to question neutrality as the Leitmotif of foreign policy.260 
Carlo Moos argues that the failure of the proposal for Switzerland to join the UN in the 
1986 referendum can be explained by the unassertive and isolationistic policy of the 
Federal Council in 1946.261 Georg Kreis adds that Federal Councilor Max Petitpierre, 
Foreign Minister in 1946, supported a “maximalistic prospect of neutrality” and 
“invented a verbal celebration of the idea of neutrality, as it was never practiced 
before.”262 Furthermore, the formula “neutrality and solidarity” invented the artificial 
differentiation between “technical” and “political” fields of cooperation with collective 
security organizations. This idea and the belief in a “special role” for Switzerland guided 
Swiss thinking for decades.263 
In 1946, the Swiss government implemented the new policy in an effort to escape 
international isolation. In April 1946, after the official dissolution of the League, 
Switzerland handed over the League’s Geneva offices to the UN. The city became later 
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the European seat and the humanitarian or “technical” hub for the organization. The 
Federal Council ensured a “tacit protection of Swiss security and neutrality apropos to the 
Geneva office” and “emphasized that under no circumstances would United Nations 
military operations be directed from Swiss territory.”264 Furthermore, Switzerland 
opened a liaison office at the UN headquarters in New York and managed in 1948 to 
institutionalize the status of a Permanent Observer.265 In addition, after a parliamentary 
debate, Switzerland became a member of the International Court of Justice. The country 
joined also several sub-agencies of the UN.266 Moreover, in 1946, the Washington 
agreement solved the German financial assets problem and normalized the relationship 
with the United States.267 Finally, after twenty-nine years of ideological hostilities, from 
1917 to 1946, Switzerland entered into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. This 
was a crucial step for future relations with the UN and for the credibility of Swiss 
neutrality.268  
As early as in 1946, William Rappard wrote: “the Charter in fact implies no real 
danger to the national independence of any one of its signatories. To put it more bluntly, 
the freedom of the many is guaranteed by the disunity of the few, at the cost, it is true, of 
the security of all.”269 At the end of the year, the bipolar world was casting its shadows 
and the accuracy of Rappard’s insight would soon become evident. 
C. SWISS NEUTRALITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS, 1948–1965 
Several international crises, the consolidation of the Cold War, and the 
transformation of the UN marked the time period from 1949 to 1965. It was a time when 
the neutral countries and the UN recognized the limits of the new collective security 
system. The major powers resorted again to the time-tested tool of alliances, which was 
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evidence of diminishing trust in collective security. In a complementary development, the 
notion of neutrality regained some of its international reputation because of the emerging 
bipolar system and the paralysis of the United Nations Security Council. These 
developments buttressed Switzerland’s dogmatic neutrality policy. At the same time, 
however, they allowed a gradual consolidation of Switzerland’s relationship with the UN, 
which culminated in a change of governmental policy in 1965. 
As mentioned, the discord in the Security Council between the Soviet Union and 
the Western powers, as well as the realities of an emerging bipolar system, overrode the 
great powers’ moral reservations concerning neutrality. Numerous references to 
neutrality in the Geneva Conventions in 1949, the Neutral Nations Supervisory 
Commission (NNSC) after the Korean War in 1953, the imposed Austrian neutrality 
based on the Swiss example in 1955, the neutralization of Laos in 1965, and finally the 
UN membership of all neutral countries but Switzerland reflected this change.270  
At the same time, the UN increased its universality, both in terms of membership 
and scope of activities. The original character of the UN changed significantly with the 
membership of decolonized third world countries and former enemies, such as Japan and 
Italy. Furthermore, the UN expanded its thematic scope and initiated a series of new 
programs and sub-organizations. Finally, the organization circumvented to some extent 
the stalemate in the Security Council and started to play a productive peacekeeping role 
in several conflicts.271 
An intense domestic neutrality debate accompanied the Korean War and 
Switzerland’s contribution in the NNSC. A few members of parliament questioned the 
country’s neutrality more than at any other time during the Cold War.272 Furthermore, the 
advent of nuclear weapons initiated a military discussion of whether armed neutrality was 
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still feasible. In addition, the Federal Council clarified that the neutrality of the state did 
not require the ideological neutrality of the citizens, thereby, sending a strong signal that 
Switzerland, in terms of politics, ideology, and economy, belonged to the West.273 
The Korea crisis started also a slow process of Swiss participation in UN peace 
keeping activities. The concept of “active neutrality” began to spread.274 The Federal 
Council justified the Swiss NNSC engagement by stating that “Neutrality cannot be 
purely passive; on the contrary, it must be put at the service of peace,” and that Swiss 
participation was “a moral obligation.”275 Further examples were Switzerland’s financial, 
logistical, and limited personnel support for the UN missions in Suez (1956), Congo 
(1960) and Cyprus (1964).276  
Austria’s accession to the UN in 1955 irritated Switzerland. How could a 
permanently neutral country have joined a collective security organization? The official 
answer was that Switzerland was an entirely different case.277 This not only reinforced 
the “special role” argument, but also supplied evidence that in a climate of commitment 
to a unique neutrality doctrine a different view was not possible. The experiences of the 
neutral countries within the UN, however, were closely monitored. The fact that neither 
Sweden nor Austria had a significant neutrality problem (to the contrary, both countries 
provided a UN Secretary General) certainly influenced Swiss public opinion in the long 
term. 
Despite these developments, for the Swiss public, the government, and most of 
the elite, neutrality remained carved in stone. The ideological and inflexible approach to 
the concept, and the idea of Switzerland’s special role in the international system, were 
supported by the relative success of neutrality in this period, especially in comparison to 
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Switzerland’s position immediately after World War II. Therefore, the early Cold War 
saw a widening gap between words and deeds in Switzerland’s neutrality policy, and, if 
viewed from a different angle, the extension of “an isolationistic neutrality conception” 
with “a non-isolationistic solidarity slogan,” at least in the domestic perception.278 
It was not until 1965 that the UN membership debate resumed with a 
parliamentary appeal. The Federal Council answered that UN membership would be 
“expedient.” One year later, however, the Foreign Minister, Willy Spühler, declared, in a 
decisive turn in the official policy, that UN membership would be compatible with 
permanent neutrality. According to Reinhold Hohengartner, three factors led to this new 
approach. First, Switzerland’s cooperation with the UN did not negatively impact its 
neutrality. Second, the same was true for the other neutral member countries. Third, in his 
judgment during the second half of the 1960s the “special role” argument lost some 
appeal.279 Georg Kreis attributed this policy shift to general changes in society in the mid 
1960s and to a desire for reform in response to the general “malaise” in foreign policy.280        
This policy change in 1965 led not only to the referendum in 1986, as outlined in 
the next section, but served as the argumentative starting point for the success in 2002. 
D. THE 1986 UNITED NATIONS REFERENDUM 
1. Introduction 
Four developments influenced and characterized the political debate from 1965 to 
1986. First, the continuing trend toward a universal UN led in Switzerland to an 
increasing sense of isolation. The number of UN member states rose from 117 in 1965 to 
159 in 1984. The accession of East and West Germany in 1973 was psychologically 
important because it completed the transformation of the UN from a coalition of victors 
to a truly universal organization.281 At the same time, it devalued Switzerland’s 
Permanent Observer status. In 1966, the Foreign Minister “recognized a tendency from 
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bilateralism outside of the United Nations to multilateral relations in the framework of the 
United Nations.”282 In 1969, 1971, and 1977, the Federal Council outlined the evolution 
of the Swiss–UN relationship in three reports to the parliament.283 In the first two reports, 
the Federal Council still saw, based on the “special role” argument, advantages for 
Switzerland in remaining outside of the UN. In 1977, however, the report referred several 
times to the diminishing international understanding for Switzerland’s “special role” and 
the country’s increasing difficulties in its efforts to actively influence the work of the 
UN.284 
Second, mandatory economic and political sanctions, as in the case of the 
Rhodesia crisis, challenged the concept of integral neutrality in practice. The Federal 
Council stated in 1967 that the crisis had shown that economic sanctions were still 
possible, despite the fact that the pertinent articles of the Charter had not been used for 
two decades.285 The Foreign Minister, Willy Spühler, stated that “politically, although 
not legally, Switzerland faces the same problems in the Rhodesian situation as a neutral 
state that is a member of the United Nations.”286 When the UN, from 1967 to 1981, in 
several steps, imposed financial, economic, and diplomatic sanctions on Rhodesia, the 
organization increased its pressure on Switzerland by monitoring and reporting the 
country’s compliance. Switzerland only partially supported the sanctions, referring to its 
neutrality policy and the principle of courant normale. The Swiss government 
“repeatedly emphasized the autonomous nature of its action,” initially justified by 
neutrality, and later, in a remarkable but not acknowledged shift, by the argument of non-
membership.287 John Ross’ study shows that during the Rhodesian crisis “the [Swiss] 
government’s views of sanctions were coming in a sense full circle, approaching its 
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attitude of 1919–20, that neutrality was not an absolute barrier to participation in a 
sanctions operation.”288 In 1973, a governmental commission stated that traditional Swiss 
neutrality “would allow to some extent Switzerland’s participation in certain mandatory 
sanctions of a non-military nature.”289 
Third, Switzerland continued to develop closer ties with the UN. By 1977, it was 
a member of most of the United Nations technical and humanitarian sub-organizations 
and a major financial contributor.290  
Finally, these developments were not followed up by a real national debate about 
Switzerland’s neutrality conception and its relationship with the UN. The parliament 
criticized all three governmental UN reports for inconsistencies between their contents, 
which had a positive attitude to UN membership, and their conclusions, which stated that 
membership “could momentarily not be proposed,” (1969) that the report should not 
“prejudice the question of membership,” but that “membership could be envisaged in a 
not too distant future,” (1971) and that membership would be “desired” (1977).291 The 
parliament, however, acted no differently and argued that the Swiss public was not ready 
for UN membership. Indeed, this unwillingness to enter into a public discussion is 
strikingly supported by a media study. It shows that from 1971 to 1985, neutrality was a 
non-topic in the leading Swiss newspapers.292 
Even after the Federal Council had expressed its desire for Switzerland to join the 
UN in 1977, it took nine years—a period of unusual length—until the referendum was 
held. In 1981, the Federal Council submitted to the Federal Assembly a proposal for the 
accession of Switzerland to the UN. In 1984, the Assembly approved the proposal by a 
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vote of 138 to 94.293 Finally, in 1986, the public overwhelmingly rejected the proposal in 
a referendum, with 75.7 percent voting “no” and with all 26 cantons voting against 
membership. The voter turnout was 50.7 percent.294 
2. External Factors 
From 1977 to 1986, no major international developments challenged the three 
Cold War axioms of Swiss foreign policy: neutrality, anti-communism, and economic 
integration without political integration in Europe.295 Positive developments such as 
détente and arms control talks were nullified by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
1979.296 Daniel Möckli stated that Soviet operations in Afghanistan, the intermediate-
range missile controversy, the increased rivalry between the superpowers, and the U.S. 
Strategic Defense Initiative created “extremely unfavorable international prefixes” for the 
1986 referendum.297 
The UN itself further consolidated universal membership with the accession of 
twelve mainly small states between 1977 and 1986. The Security Council, however, was 
still in a Cold War mode, and, with hindsight, acted rather lethargically during this 
period. The consequence was general mistrust in the efficiency and bureaucracy of the 
organization.298 When the referendum was held in March 1986, one month after 
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Gorbatchev declared the policies of Perestroika and Glasnost, and one month before the 
Chernobyl disaster, the world was still in a stable bipolar environment; and almost no one 
predicted the end of the Cold War. 
Therefore, no single external factor can explain why the referendum was held in 
1986 and not at another point in time. One can conclude that neither external pressure, 
nor massive changes in the international system required a review of Swiss foreign policy 
in regard to collective security, or required the Swiss to rethink or question their 
neutrality. On the other hand, there is much evidence that without the gradual change in 
the character of the UN, Swiss membership would have been out of question. In addition, 
the relative weakness of the collective security concept during the Cold War, the good 
experiences of other neutral countries as UN members, and diffuse signals about a 
possible Swiss isolation, paved the road to the referendum.  
3. Internal Factors  
Was the exact date defined by domestic factors? The evidence tends to support an 
answer of “no.” There were no significant shifts in domestic politics, no domestic crises, 
no changes in public opinion, and no adjusted neutrality discourse in the years prior to 
1986. Instead, one can argue that the continuous collective security experience of the UN 
and the gradual reinterpretation of Switzerland’s neutrality in light of foreign policy 
practice led the Federal Council to conclude that the time was right for a public debate. 
From 1977 to 1986, domestic politics were traditionally stable and all major 
parties were represented in the government. One can identify only with hindsight the 
emergence of green and far right parties in the late 1970s, and the growth of a so called 
post-materialistic society. The fact that in 1986 a small group gathered enough public 
support for a national vote to abolish the Swiss army indicated this change. It was a 
strong signal that long term taboos were increasingly attacked and publicly debated.299 
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These trends made UN membership and a unbiased discussion of Swiss neutrality more 
likely; however, they came too late for the referendum in 1986. 
Public opinion polls during the Cold War confirmed the Federal Council’s 
judgment that the Swiss had no strong feelings for the UN. In 1947, 57 percent of the 
Swiss supported UN membership only if the country’s neutrality could be guaranteed. 
Later polls from 1967 to 1977 showed that only 32 percent to 45 percent would support 
this idea.300 From 1977 to 1986, these numbers did not significantly change.301 
Despite this negative attitude of the population, it is striking that the Federal 
Council never seriously launched a discussion on UN membership prior to 1981. Three 
factors, all of them specific inherent problems of the Swiss political system, may explain 
this behavior. First, in a direct democracy with a part-time parliament and a consensus 
based government, the executive’s political will is often not strong enough to attack 
highly controversial issues. Second, Swiss domestic policy influences, to a large extent, 
foreign policy, and almost “any foreign policy question can lead to a major domestic 
political conflict.”302 Finally, and most important, the study by Georg Kreis provides 
evidence that the character of the neutrality discourse during the Cold War, mainly the 
repeated political celebration of traditional neutrality and the disconnection between the 
neutrality discussion and the actual neutrality policy in practice, did not allow a verbal 
return to differential neutrality.303 Because the neutrality concept was untouchable, the 
Federal Council was locked in its own 1946 argument that UN membership was 
incompatible with Swiss neutrality.304   This basic dilemma, the gap between deeds in 
foreign policy and words in domestic policy, was not solved prior to the 1986 
referendum.  
In sum, as with the external factors, no clear single domestic factor led directly to 
the 1986 referendum. It seems that the point in time was to some extent arbitrary. It is 
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certainly true that personal initiative and beliefs of individual members of the Federal 
Council, and members of Parliament, were important. A decisive role by a single person, 
however, cannot be detected.305 Furthermore, there is not much evidence for the 
argument that the 1986 referendum was intentionally launched to provoke a failure, in 
order to pave the way for a more successful second referendum.306 
The widespread reluctance of the Swiss elite to support the cause of UN 
membership was reflected in a lukewarm “yes” campaign, which ultimately led to the 
failure of the referendum. 
4. The “Yes” Campaign 
In 1985, the supporting committee was founded under the lead of a former 
Federal Councilor and consisted of politicians from all major parties. It had only limited 
financial resources and could not attract charismatic personalities.307 In contrast to the 
opponents of the referendum, the supporters had a difficult start. First, they had to rely on 
a weak product. A parliamentarian, Helmut Hubacher, explained later that “there was no 
courage, no steam, no pressure, no bravery, no perspective, and no optimism” in the 
political process leading to the referendum proposal.308 Second, they had the burden of 
proof in their efforts to explain to the population why Switzerland should now join the 
UN after everything had gone rather well for four decades.309 
The main arguments emphasized the utility of UN membership for Switzerland 
and the usefulness of the organization in general. Supporters of membership argued that a 
more proactive Swiss foreign policy was needed to overcome the economic integration 
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versus political isolation dilemma.310 In their view, UN membership would not only 
improve the international reputation of the country but also strengthen the UN as a whole. 
As a member, they argued, Switzerland could actively influence UN decisions and 
contribute with its longstanding humanitarian and democratic experience. 
The pro-committee and the Federal Council took an ambivalent position on the 
neutrality question. On one hand, they declared that neutrality was not a problem. This 
argument was supported by long legal and technical abstracts that proved the 
compatibility of UN membership with Swiss permanent neutrality. On the other hand, the 
Federal Council explained carefully that certain developments in the international 
environment made it difficult to follow a traditional neutrality policy.311 The logical gap 
between these two explanations was, of course, not addressed. Furthermore, these rational 
and legalistic arguments ignored the fact that for the Swiss people, neutrality is primarily 
an emotional construct, which is foremost part of national identity, and only secondarily a 
security policy concept.312 
The Federal Council avoided reference to the League of Nations and the 
terminology of “differential neutrality.”313 More importantly, despite the fact that 
neutrality was declared to be a minor problem for UN membership, the parliament added 
two articles into the referendum text that stressed the importance of neutrality. The first 
article required the Federal Council to prepare a “ceremonial declaration” and a note to 
all other UN members stating that Switzerland would remain permanently neutral. The 
second article stipulated that the Federal Council would highlight Swiss neutrality in its 
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accession request to the UN.314 With such an emphasis on neutrality, opponents had an 
easy time asserting that neutrality seemed to be a major problem.  
In sum, the UN membership supporters could not influence the masses with a 
weak campaign committee and a reactive and passive Federal Council. The campaign 
was fought with rational and honest, but legalistic and intellectual, arguments. The pro 
committee was unable to exploit emotional arguments, such as fear of isolation, because 
it did not address the consequences of further non-membership. Even this strategy, 
however, would have had little success, because at that time, more than 71 percent of the 
Swiss saw no contradiction between expressing solidarity with the international 
community and staying outside of the UN.315 
5. The “No” Campaign 
In 1981, four years earlier than the UN supporters took organizational action, a 
broad committee of politicians and personalities across the political spectrum organized 
the “no” campaign. The stronghold of the committee was, however, in the conservative 
center and the political right. The co-presidents were not only well known politicians but 
also successful and wealthy entrepreneurs.316     
The “no” arguments concentrated on two themes. First, the UN was discredited as 
an ineffective and inefficient organization of the Cold War, dominated by the Security 
Council and a majority made up of Third World and communist countries. The “no” 
campaign used the League of Nations as an example of how such collective security 
systems have failed.317 Second, the opponents of membership forecast the loss of 
neutrality and the consequent loss of national sovereignty and independence. This 
argument appealed to the mythological character of neutrality and to traditional fears of 
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losing Swiss sovereignty.318 The UN membership opponents stressed the security 
function of neutrality, and also succeeded in linking the national identity function to the 
question of UN membership.  
Furthermore, the opponents used a language that foreshadowed a new populist 
political style. They worked with simple key words, symbols, vague fears and emotions. 
As a result, no real dialogue or debate about the subject took place, because the rational 
pro-arguments and the emotional contra-arguments were disconnected.319 The simple 
campaign message stated that UN accession would mean less neutrality, less 
independence, and less security with increased costs and more civil servants.320 The new 
style was also reflected in arguments not related to the UN. For example, opponents of 
UN membership asserted that there was a widening gap between the elite in Berne and 
the Swiss people. Consequently, the Federal Council was accused of being out of touch 
with the population. This was a powerful argument in a country where authorities are 
always seen with suspicion.321 
6. Summary 
The 1986 referendum failed, to some extent, because four decades of celebrating 
the victory of neutrality in World War II created an environment of isolationistic self-
satisfaction. In addition, a lack of leadership, in the form of a weak, defensive and 
reactive Federal Council, provided insufficient political leverage for the pro-
committee.322 The desire to preserve neutrality, however, was not the sole reason for the 
negative outcome. The lack of trust in the United Nations, financial considerations, and a 
general mistrust in the political establishment were also important.323 Finally, the lack of 
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support from the wealthy, the absence of a broad alliance of the political elite, and the 
inability of the pro-committee to counter the populist campaign of the opponents, were 
additional reasons for the “no.” 
It was mentioned that no single external or internal factor triggered the UN 
referendum in 1986. Instead, four decades of transformation of the UN, increasingly 
intense Swiss relations with the organization, and a gradual change in the practical 
function of neutrality convinced the Federal Council that the question of UN membership 
could be reviewed. It is not surprising that the referendum campaign could not achieve 
within a few months the same mental progress in the Swiss public.  
Neutrality played a decisive role in the UN discussions throughout the Cold War 
and the referendum debate. For various reasons, the Federal Council did not dare to 
question traditional neutrality.324 The consequence was that in 1986 neutrality still held 
mythical status in the national psyche. The government’s slow and silent change of its 
neutrality policy, from traditional neutrality to differential neutrality, was neither 
explained to the public, nor officially debated. The referendum debate provided evidence 
that in 1986 Swiss neutrality was attributed several meanings. For the supporters of UN 
membership, the concept was, once again, compatible with collective security. For the 
opponents, the concept still stood for the “special role” of Switzerland, and served as a 
guarantor of its independence. 
In accordance with a Swiss domestic political rule of thumb, the UN question was 
a dead subject for at least a decade. 
E. THE 2002 INITIATIVE AND ACCESSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS 
1. Introduction 
 With the international changes at the end of the century, parliamentary support for 
UN membership reemerged in 1990, 1995, and 1997. The Federal Council answered 
positively to these requests, but said that the time was not “ready” for a new referendum. 
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In 1998, finally, the government stated unconditionally that “a permanently neutral 
country has its place in the United Nations,” and the Federal Council declared in a report 
on the UN its desire for Switzerland to join the organization as soon as possible.325 
In early 2000, an initiative326 committee for the accession of Switzerland to the 
UN, formed in 1998, handed over 124,772 signatures to the Federal Chancellery.327 The 
initiative sought to add article 24, “Switzerland joins the United Nations,” to the 
constitution.328 In 2001, after the parliamentary debate, the Federal Assembly 
recommended to the people and the cantons to accept the proposal with a vote of 189 to 
44.329 In the 2002 ballot, the initiative passed with 54.6 percent “yes” votes and with 12 
of 23 cantonal votes.330 The voter turnout was 57.4 percent, the highest in a decade. 
According to Georg Kreis, five important steps led to a further transformation in 
Switzerland’s relationship to the United Nations and its neutrality policy, and 
consequently, to the successful initiative: the end of the Cold War from 1990 to 1993, 
Swiss accession to the Bretton Woods organizations in 1992, the blue-helmet referendum 
in 1994, the UN jubilee in 1994, and the revision of the military law in 2001.331 Thomas 
Bernauer stated that “the change in Central and Eastern Europe, the Gulf War, the 
                                                 
325 Federal Council quoted in Kreis, Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart, 176–177. 
Translation by the author. For the debate of whether the initiative was “ordered“ by the Federal Council, 
see  Ibid. 
326 A popular initiative is a specific popular right in the Swiss direct democracy. An initiative requires 
100,000 valid signatures of Swiss citizens in order to propose a change to the Swiss constitution.  
327 Schweizerische Bundeskanzlei, Eidgenössische Volksinitiative für den Beitritt der Schweiz zur 
Organisation der Vereinten Nationen (UNO) (Bern: Schweizerische Bundeskanzlei, 2000), 2453, 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2000/2453.pdf (accessed April 18, 2009).  
328 Schweizer Bundesrat, Botschaft über die Volksinitiative “Für den Beitritt der Schweiz zur 
Organisation der Vereinten Nationen (UNO)” (Bern: Schweizerische Bundeskanzlei, 2000), 1186, 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2001/1183.pdf (accessed April 18, 2009). Translation by the author. 
329 In 100 years, the Federal Council supported only five initiatives. Michel Hottelier, “L'adhésion de 
la Suisse à l'Organisation des Nations Unies : Aspects constitutionnels,” Revue Française de Droit 
Constitutionnel 51, no. 3 (2002): 496, http://www.cairn.info/article.php?ID_REVUE=RFDC&ID_NUM 
PUBLIE=RFDC_051&ID_ARTICLE=RFDC_051_0485 (accessed 05/08/2009). For details of the 
parliamentary debate, see Kreis, Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart, 178–179. 
330 Schweizer Bundesrat, Bundesratsbeschluss über das Ergebnis der Volksabstimmung vom 03. März 
2002 (Bern: Schweizerische Bundeskanzlei, 2002), 3690, http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2002/3690.pdf 
(accessed April 18, 2009). 
331 Kreis, Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart, 159ff. 
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Kosovo conflict, the wider and deeper European Union and the World War II Nazi gold 
controversy” led to the Swiss elite’s belief that security and welfare could only be 
guaranteed through closer international cooperation.332 Whatever one adds to this list (for 
example, the terror attacks of 2001), one thing is evident: the period between the two UN 
ballots was one of fundamental change. The impact of these external and internal factors 
is discussed below. 
2. External Factors 
The end of the Cold War and the bipolar system had two consequences. First, a 
major obstacle to an effective collective security system was removed. Second, the 
practical value of neutrality further declined, not the least in the face of the unification of 
Europe. The continued relevance of the latter point, however, depends on the future 
character of the international system. In the 1990s, three developments seemed possible: 
the emergence of a global hegemony, a reinforced system of collective security and 
international integration, or a new system of a global balance of power. Chapter II has 
shown that, in theory, the first two possibilities would seriously challenge the concept of 
neutrality. 
The new prospects for collective security were felt immediately. The 1990 
Security Council decision regarding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing Gulf 
War symbolized the new utility and unity of the UN.333 Furthermore, since 1990, thirty 
small and newly sovereign states had joined the organization, thereby further 
strengthening its universality. Aside from the Holy See, Switzerland remained the last 
country with an observer status.334  
                                                 
332 Bernauer and Lavenex, Abschied vom Sonderfall, 89. Translation by the author. 
333 Ibid., 91 
334 It was, in fact, the only country, because the Holy See represents the Catholic Church and not 
simply the Vatican state. 
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This increased geographical and ideological isolation of Switzerland was further 
strengthened by the European Union (EU) membership of neutral Austria, Finland, and 
Sweden in 1995 and the introduction of the euro in neighboring countries in 1999.335 
The limited practical value of neutrality was also felt. The war in ex-Yugoslavia 
culminating in the Kosovo crisis in 1999 showed dramatically that neutrality did not 
protect Switzerland from a massive influx of refugees. Neutrality also did not protect 
Switzerland from transnational terrorism. In response to the terror attack on the United 
States in September 2001, the Swiss President, Kaspar Villliger, made clear “that there 
has never been and never will be neutrality where terrorism and criminal acts are 
concerned.”336 Finally, the fact that the UN General Assembly officially recognized 
Turkemistan’s neutrality in 1996 can be interpreted as evidence that the meaning of 
neutrality has become largely irrelevant.337 
In sum, the external factors had at least three consequences. First, the changes in 
the international system altered the balance between neutrality and collective security in 
theory and practice in favor of the UN. Second, the sanctions regime in the 1990–1991 
Gulf crisis and the return of inter- and intra-state wars to the European continent in the 
form of the struggles in the Balkans were immediate tests for Switzerland’s international 
role and its neutrality policy. Third, direct external political pressure on Switzerland, 
increased international interdependence, and a highly visible isolation of the country led 
to a broad domestic discussion, as outlined in the next section, and challenged 
longstanding values. 
                                                 
335 The monetary union and the euro as a financial currency came into effect in 1999. Paper money 
and coins were introduced in 2002. 
336 This reflects the European tendency to see terrorism foremost as a criminal problem. However, 
when the notion changed to “war on terror,” for the Swiss, neutrality became again an issue. Villiger quoted 
in UN General Assembly, General Assembly Fifty-Seventh Session, 1st Plenary Meeting, (New York: 
Official Documents System of the United Nations, 2002), 11, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ 
N02/583/32/PDF/N0258332.pdf?OpenElement (accessed March 5, 2009). 
337 UN General Assembly, Resolution 50/80: Permanent Neutrality of Turkmenistan, (New York: 
Official Documents System of the United Nations, 1996), http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N96/ 
761/23/PDF/N9676123.pdf?OpenElement (accessed March 5, 2009). 
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3. Internal Factors 
The government of Switzerland reacted quickly to this diplomatic revolution.338 
A series of governmental reports redefined the official policy of the country. The 1990 
security policy report with the title “Swiss Security Policy in Times of Changes” was 
followed by another report in 1999 titled “Security through Cooperation.” These titles 
summarize well their content and are evidence of the decline of the security function of 
neutrality. In 1993, a foreign policy report defined five new foreign policy aims and 
replaced neutrality with solidarity as the major foreign policy instrument. Although some 
scholars in 2001 argued critically that the relationship between security policy and 
neutrality, as outlined in the reports, was “ambivalent and contradictory,” it was an 
important intermediate step that led to the further transformation of neutrality.339 
In a persistent pattern since 1945, the changes in neutrality policy were not 
declared as such. When the UN imposed sanctions on Iraq in 1990, Switzerland 
autonomously followed this action, and, thereby, for the first time in its history with 
collective security organizations, fully applied a differential neutrality.340 The Federal 
Council and the Foreign Ministry declared these sanctions entirely in line with “the 
continuous Swiss neutrality policy,” and added that the policy of courant normale was 
out of the question because this would be a “decision of fear, of cowardice.”341 
During the Kosovo crisis in 1998–1999, the situation was different from that with 
Iraq and Kuwait in 1990–1991 and the Swiss government showed an “inconsistent” 
position regarding economic sanctions, transit rights, and arms embargos. The absence of 
                                                 
338 “Quickly” in Switzerland is measured in years. Consensus building among all major political 
parties, a part time parliament, and 26 cantons takes time. 
339 See for example Heiko Borchert, “Switzerland and Europe's Security Architecture: The Rocky 
Road from Isolation to Cooperation,” in Small States and Alliances, eds. Erich Reiter and Heinz Gärtner 
(New York: Physica-Verlag, 2001), 170. 
340 In contrast to 1990, Switzerland did not fully implement the League’s sanctions on Italy in 1938. In 
both cases, however, Switzerland retained the right to decide autonomously on participation in the 
sanctions imposed by a collective security organization. See Chapter III for details. 
341 Cited in Kreis, Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart. Translation by the author. 
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a UN mandate for NATO’s air campaign and the unilateral economic sanctions of the EU 
brought a new dimension and new challenges to differential neutrality.342 
Switzerland further approached the UN system, and in 2000, Thomas Bernauer 
wrote about a “90 percent membership.”343 The three newly created Geneva centers, the 
increased Swiss involvement in human rights and against war crimes, plus its massive 
foreign aid were clear signals of the implementation of the solidarity strategy.344 In 
addition, the fifty-year jubilee of the UN in 1994 was used for an important governmental 
public relations campaign.345    
The public approved this new openness to the United Nations at the ballot box 
although the results were mixed. The Swiss refused to contribute a blue helmet battalion 
to the UN in 1994. In contrast, in 2001, in a revision of the military law, the population 
agreed to let Swiss peacekeeping forces carry arms for self-defense. This was an 
important signal that a slim majority supported more “openness.”346 The participation of 
the Swiss Army in KFOR since 1999 and the change from a UNPROFOR type of 
peacekeeping to a NATO type of peace support operations influenced this change of 
opinion. In 1992 the public approved membership in the Bretton Woods institutions but 
refused to join the European Economic Area (EEA). Hence, based on the principle of 
economic integration without political integration, the Bilateral Agreements with the EU 
passed in 2000. This referendum stood for the consensus that only close cooperation with 
the EU could ensure the future economic prosperity of Switzerland. 
The population was not only politicized by the pace of major foreign policy 
decisions but it had to live through several crises that challenged traditional perceptions. 
The first crisis was the Nazi gold debate.347 In 1996, certain groups in the United States 
accused Switzerland and its banks, using the rhetoric of 1945, of profiting from dormant 
                                                 
342 Kreis, Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart. 226–228. Translation by the author. 
343 Bernauer and Lavenex, Abschied vom Sonderfall, 89. 
344 Ibid., 91–92. 
345 Kreis, Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart, 172ff. 
346 Ibid., 175–177. 
347 Ibid., 234ff. 
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accounts of Holocaust victims. The discussion until 2002 challenged the Swiss perception 
of its role in World War II and put the moral aspect of Swiss neutrality into question and 
into a new perspective. Georg Kreis makes a significant observation by stating that the 
calm public reaction to the final report in 2002 showed that neutrality had lost some of its 
general importance.348 Another crisis was the so called “Swissair Grounding” in 2001. It 
was an example of how a national symbol broke down, and it showed the limits of an 
autonomous airline within the advance of global capitalism and the unification of the 
European continent. Although the literature does not discuss this aspect, the author can 
confirm from personal experience that this crisis significantly challenged the self-
perception of the Swiss. It contributed to the insight that the “special role” Switzerland 
was not that special anymore. 
In sum, in contrast to 1986, a series of internal and external factors led to a 
dynamic change and adjustment of Swiss foreign policy. The population was not only 
directly affected by those events but also expressed its opinion on the country’s future 
foreign policy course in several referendums. The 2002 UN ballot needs to be evaluated 
with this dynamic background in mind. 
4. The “Yes” Campaign 
In contrast with the situation in 1986, the pro-committee could rely on broad 
support from the Swiss elite. One hundred thirty seven of 155 organizations supported the 
initiative, including all major political parties with the exception of the Swiss People’s 
Party and the tiny Evangelic People’s Party.349 More importantly, the country’s economic 
elite now fully supported the campaign.350   
The main arguments of the pro-campaign were similar to those used in 1986. But, 
there were some differences. First, the argument that full membership would be a logical 
final step that would not change the Swiss-UN relationship beyond the fact that the 
                                                 
348 Kreis, Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart, 239. 
349 Enzelsberger, Die Schweiz und die UNO, 36. 
350 For details, see Ueli Forster, “Stabilität ist Voraussetzung für Erfolg,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung 26 
(February 1,2002): 15. 
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country would now have a say was now more convincing. Second, there was a new 
emphasis on the fact that the UN created security. This argument was supported by 
military actions in the Balkans and elsewhere. Third, the argument that the UN had 
changed was more credible. Fourth, the terrorism argument was a new and convincing 
proof that worldwide interdependence did not stop at the Swiss border.351 Fifth, due to 
the support of the wealthy, economic arguments were more important than in 1986, and 
the implied message was that further isolation would hurt the Swiss economy.352 
Neutrality was again an important part of the argumentation, although not 
decisive for the outcome of the ballot. In the official ballot brochure, the Federal Council 
printed the draft letter to the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, with the Swiss 
accession request. The letter declared, in well chosen words, that the Federal Council and 
the Federal Assembly had been tasked by the Swiss people and the cantons to protect the 
confederation and its neutral status.353 A second sentence was copied from the 1996 UN 
General Assembly declaration regarding the permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan. It 
stated further that “The United Nations recognizes that the neutrality of a Member State 
does not affect the fulfillment of its obligations under the Charter and contributes to the 
achievement of the purposes of the United Nations.”354 The parliamentary debate was 
evidence that the practical implications of neutrality were no longer in the forefront. 
Instead, neutrality was openly declared as a national mythos and Switzerland could carry 
this mythos into the UN, as other nations did with theirs.355 
                                                 
351 Schweizer Bundesrat, Volksabstimmung vom 3. März 2002: Erläuterungen des Bundesrates (Bern: 
Schweizerische Bundeskanzlei, 2002), http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/va/20020303/explic/uno1_24D.pdf 
(accessed April 18, 2009). 
352 Michèle Roth, “Volksmehr und Ständemehr,” Vereinte Nationen: Zeitschrift für die Vereinten 
Nationen und ihre Sonderorganisationen 50, no. 3 (2002): 122, http://www.dgvn.de/fileadmin/user_upload/ 
PUBLIKATIONEN/Zeitschrift_VN/VN_2002/VN_3_2002.pdf (accessed May 8, 2009). 
353 Schweizer Bundesrat, Volksabstimmung vom 3. März 2002: Erläuterungen des Bundesrates. 
354 UN General Assembly, General Assembly Fifty-Sixth Session, Application of the Swiss 
Confederation for Admission to Membership in the United Nations, (New York: Official Documents 
System of the United Nations, 2002), http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/487/22/PDF/ 
N0248722.pdf?OpenElement (accessed March 5, 2009). See also UN General Assembly, Resolution 50/80: 
Permanent Neutrality of Turkmenistan. 
355 Kreis, Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart, 179. 
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Although the pro-campaign was to a large extent positive and rational, the post-
ballot analysis shows a different picture. The main reasons for the “yes” vote were “fear 
of political isolation,” and the judgment that a Switzerland that “stands aside is no longer 
feasible.” Furthermore, the “yes” voters were concerned about the image of 
Switzerland.356 It is not difficult to conclude that these voters had been influenced by the 
external and internal events described in the previous sections. 
5. The “No” Campaign 
The contra-committee was predominantly the same as in 1986. It was composed 
of the AUNS357 and personalities of the Swiss People’s Party. The campaign was again 
fought in the style of the new tradition of the populist right.  
Neutrality was the main argument for opposing UN accession and the main 
campaign poster showed an ax destroying the word neutrality.358 The arguments were the 
same as in 1986, although many of them were weakened by the new geopolitical situation 
and the new strength of the UN.359 In contrast to 1986, the pro-committee was far better 
prepared to counter the neutrality argument. Its members pointed to the fact that for a 
decade Switzerland had used differential neutrality in cases where the world was united 
against a belligerent. In contrast to 1986, when the burden of proof was on the proponents 
of UN membership, the opposition now faced this challenge. 
 
 
                                                 
356 Hans Hirter and Wolf Linder, “Analyse der eidgenössischen Abstimmungen vom 3. März 2002,” 
VOX Analysen der eidgenössischen Urnengänge (Bern: Institut für Politikwissenschaften, Universität Bern, 
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populist right-wing Swiss People’s Party. Moos, Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO, 121. 
358 Kreis, Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart, 181. 
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A new argument portrayed UN membership as a first step to NATO and EU 
membership. But, this argument did not work well. The public support for Swiss 
membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace, Swiss participation in NATO-led peace 
support operations, and the bilateral agreements with the EU showed that the population 
was able to differentiate between the different degrees of integration into the UN, NATO 
and the EU. 
6. Summary 
The referendum was successful because, in comparison to 1986, the campaigns 
had essentially swapped starting positions in 2002. The supporters of UN membership 
could rely on a broad alliance and were assisted by a pro-active and united Federal 
Council. Because the “yes” committee was better prepared to counter the emotional 
neutrality argument, it could diffuse the claim that UN accession threatened national 
identity and sovereignty.  
In addition, opponents failed to transform the UN question into an elite versus 
population debate. As a consequence, the outcome showed the traditional cleavages 
between rural and urban areas and between the German and French speaking parts of 
Switzerland.360 This pattern was similar to the League of Nations ballot in 1920 and 
furnished evidence that all political forces have to be united in order to outvote the 
traditional, isolationistic German speaking cantons.361     
While the campaign can explain the close victory, it cannot explain why even one 
third of the AUNS members who voted against UN membership in 1986 were in favor of 
the UN in 2002.362 In public polls, support for the UN in the 1980s was between 30 
percent and 40 percent, climbing steeply to 50 percent in 1991 and dropping back to 40 
percent in the mid-1990s before finally rising up to 60 percent in 1999.363  
 
                                                 
360 Roth, Volksmehr und Ständemehr, 123. 
361 There is no space to discuss the complex underlying political cleavages in Swiss politics.  
362 Ibid., 123. 
363 Bernauer and Lavenex, Abschied vom Sonderfall, 93. 
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While in 1986, 54 percent of the Swiss saw neutrality as a major obstacle to UN 
membership, this view was only shared by 28 percent in 2002.364 This is more or less the 
difference that led to a “yes” majority.  
This chapter suggests that the 30 percent shift across the public, viewing 
neutrality as compatible with collective security, was influenced by the outlined external 
and internal changes. A decade of a pragmatic neutrality policy in conjunction with the 
demystification of the concept allowed this change of perception. Additional reasons for 
the successful referendum were a general belief that change was good and a relaxed 
handling of Switzerland’s “special role” image.365  
F. CONCLUSION 
Carlo Moos mentioned in his comparative study that the different outcomes of the 
1920 League of Nations referendum and the 1986 UN referendum cannot be explained by 
analyzing the pro and contra arguments, because they were not fundamentally different. 
Instead, the character of the campaigns, the personalities involved and the historic context 
led to the different outcomes.366 This thesis draws a similar conclusion for the 1986 and 
2002 referendums. 
The 2002 initiative passed because a united political and economic elite supported 
it. Moreover, a good quarter of the population gradually changed its mind in the decade 
following the end of the Cold War. Although a causal link is difficult to prove, it is safe 
to argue that events such as 9/11, the collapse of Swissair, and the Kosovo war showed 
the limits of Swiss autonomy, not only for the academic elite, but also to a large portion 
of the Swiss people. In 1986, isolation was only a theoretical argument, but by 2002 it 
had turned into a real concern that provided additional “yes” votes.  
Neutrality was a central argument in both campaigns. Because a decline of 
popular support for neutrality cannot be observed, only a change in the population’s 
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understanding of neutrality can explain the difference between 1986 and 2002. This thesis 
argues that when the security function of neutrality declined, the second function—
solidarity—was used to reconstruct the myth of neutrality. The chapter showed, however, 
that because of governmental policy and rhetoric after 1946, it took half a century, and 
external changes and pressures after the end of the Cold War, to convince the Swiss 
people that the solidarity part of neutrality would be consistent with membership in the 
UN. The fact that the UN officially declared neutrality compatible with collective 
security facilitated this process. 
A basic debate about Swiss neutrality and its replacement by solidarity was often 
recommended by the academic world.367 However, neither the Federal Council nor the 
political elite was willing to question a political ideal that had a 90 percent acceptance in 
the population. Even a verbal return to differential neutrality was impossible. Only 
external events and day-by-day experiences changed the public perception of neutrality to 
a degree that it resembled differential neutrality without so naming it. Swiss UN 
membership is, therefore, once again, an expression of the pragmatic compatibility of 
neutrality and solidarity. 
Swiss membership in the UN in 2002 supports the hypothesis that the country is 
only willing to join a collective security organization if there are hopes that the system 
works in practice. There is little evidence, however, of a sincere belief that the collective 
security arrangements of the UN would significantly increase Swiss security.  
This chapter provided mixed evidence for the idea that the absence of an external 
threat was the main trigger for the decline of the security function of neutrality and led, 
therefore, to the positive outcomes of the referendum. Although this claim sounds logical 
because of the end of the Cold War, it is difficult to discover causal links between the 
public perception of neutrality, external threats and the need to join a collective security 
organization by analyzing the two referendums. 
Finally, the national identity function of neutrality was reinforced during the Cold 
War. One can argue, however, that neutrality as a whole has lost some value in reference 
                                                 
367 For the replacement argument, see Moos, Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO, 176. 
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to the two other national identity pillars, federalism and direct democracy. Furthermore, 
one can observe that the debate about neutrality shifted away from the UN and security 
policy to the question of further European integration.368 
                                                 
368 Although the decreased importance of neutrality was shown in this chapter, there was no 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. DISCONTINUITIES AND CONTINUITIES FROM 1920 TO 2002 
This thesis examined two collective security systems and almost one hundred 
years of Swiss neutrality. The twentieth century saw an unprecedented level of economic, 
social, technological, ideological, and geopolitical change from the fundamentals of the 
international system from 1618 until 1918. Therefore, each of the five analyzed events—
Switzerland’s decision to join the League of Nations in 1920, the return to traditional 
neutrality in 1938, the refusal to join the United Nations (UN) in 1945, the repetition of 
this refusal in 1986, and the positive UN referendum in 2002—occurred in a unique 
international and domestic setting. Hence, absolute conclusions about historical 
continuities are always simplifications and should be considered with caution. Indeed, 
one can see many differences in the external and internal factors that influenced the Swiss 
relationship with the League and the UN, as well as the different referendum campaigns. 
On the other hand, this work identified some long term trends in the relationship between 
Swiss neutrality and collective security that will probably continue to influence 
Switzerland’s international behavior. The rhetorical celebration of stability and 
continuity, which is part of the constant self-assurance of Swiss national identity, should, 
however, not be confused with continuity of Swiss policy in reality. 
Two external factors—the changes in the international system, and the character 
of the League and the UN—determined the Swiss position on collective security. Joseph 
Kruzel summarized the relationship of the international system and neutrality: 
Over the past two centuries neutrality has thus adapted and survived 
through three very different types of international systems—the classical 
balance of power system before World War I, the collective security effort 
of the interwar years, and the bipolar system of the post—World War II 
era. Of these three systems, only the first was theoretically receptive to the 
posture of neutrality.369 
                                                 
369 Kruzel and Haltzel, Between the Blocs, 297. 
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The fourth type, the post-Cold War system, did not change this argument. In other 
words, the creation of the League after World War I was a major break with the past. In 
1920, the Swiss were exposed to a completely new attempt to organize the international 
realm, while in 1946, the UN represented only another variation of the same idea. Efraim 
Karsh explained these different starting positions of the two organizations and their 
impact on neutrality as follows: “While the participation of the small neutrals in the 
League was a result of their high hopes for the principle of collective security, their 
membership in the UN reflects a keen recognition of the operative inapplicability of the 
concept.”370 Even if viewed from a more idealistic position, it was only in the 1920s, in 
1945–1946, and again in the 1990s, that there were prospects that a universal collective 
security organization could work. This study showed that Switzerland reacted twice, 
although in 2002 with a time lag, to these historic external opportunities by joining the 
League and the UN. Chapter IV argued that the Swiss did not use the historic window in 
1945–1946 mainly for domestic reasons. Furthermore, in 1986, the stable international 
environment did not support a significant change in Swiss policy. 
This work showed that neutrality and collective security were, in contrast to 
conventional wisdom, not mutually exclusive concepts. Chapters III and IV reviewed 
evidence that neither the League nor the UN could fully resist neutrality in the long term. 
John Ross summarized this argument: 
There has been in fact a striking historical parallel between the League and 
UN systems: both appeared to eliminate the traditional régime of 
neutrality by undermining its basic premises, yet in subsequent practice, 
they have allowed for a reassertion of neutrality.371 
Hence, there was never enough international pressure, or commitment, to force 
Switzerland to abandon its neutrality, or to ban the concept of neutrality from 
international law and the international system.  
In addition to neutrality and the external factors listed above, three internal factors 
—the institutional character of the Swiss political system, the domestic perception of the 
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international role of Switzerland, and the dynamics of the referendum campaigns—
further determined the Swiss position towards collective security. The basic 
characteristics of the Swiss political system, as outlined in Chapter II, remained 
essentially unchanged since 1874.372 The consensus-based Swiss political system reacted 
patiently, prudently, and conservatively to external changes. The domestic political 
discourse contrasted with a pragmatic, realistic foreign policy. Long term trends, such as 
the increased role of the people and the parliament in foreign policy, and the new populist 
political style of the conservative right, only reinforced this mechanism. These factors 
explain Switzerland’s reluctance to adjust the traditional maxims of foreign policy, such 
as neutrality and independence. The country’s unusually long journey to UN membership 
was evidence of these exceptional domestic factors. In contrast, as showed in Chapter III, 
the quick decision to join the League of Nations was an extraordinary and singular event 
in modern Swiss history. 
Furthermore, this thesis reviewed ample evidence for the solid Swiss belief in a 
special role and an international mission for their country. No serious domestic political 
movements challenged this role perception. Any external criticism was regarded as unfair 
and answered by a self-induced isolation. Chapter IV described how this mechanism 
influenced the Swiss UN membership decision in 1946. In addition, the idea of a special 
role contributed substantially to Switzerland’s active foreign policy and its repeated 
expressions of international solidarity. 
Finally, the dynamics of referendum campaigns in general, and those on foreign 
policy decisions in particular, made the results at the ballot box to some degree 
unpredictable and random. Chapters III and IV described the major continuity in the 
arguments of the referendums for and against Swiss participation in a collective security 
organization. The political style, however, had significantly changed in the 1980s with 
the emergence of the populist right, which persisted in the 2002 referendum. These 
chapters showed, therefore, that the content and the style of the debate were not able to 
explain the different outcomes. More important were the amount of governmental effort, 
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the level of leadership, and the general commitment. It is evident from the analysis of the 
1920, 1986 and 2002 referendums that only firm and broad support by the Swiss elite 
allowed significant changes in foreign policy. In addition, this study presented some 
evidence that the public was more guided by visible signs of international isolation, and 
the general trust or mistrust in the government, than by the specific contents of the 
referendum debates. It seems, and this judgment is supported by the outcomes of the 
1920 and 2002 referendums, that only a politicized public was receptive to changes in 
foreign policy, and consequently more supportive of membership in a collective security 
organization. 
Neutrality was the single most important factor that determined the Swiss 
relationship with the League and the UN. The concept, however, was a moving target for 
analysis, because it not only significantly influenced Swiss foreign policy, but was also 
exposed to all the external and internal factors discussed in this study. The role of 
neutrality for Swiss national identity, the changing functions of neutrality, and the gap 
between words and deeds (national neutrality rhetoric and neutrality in practice) were the 
three aspects that explained most of Switzerland’s behavior. 
Switzerland’s belief in neutrality and the repeated rhetorical celebration of the 
concept were the major continuities in the last two centuries of Swiss foreign policy. 
Neutrality was at no point seriously challenged and the question of neutrality or 
collective security was asked only in academic circles. Instead, in 1920, 1946, 1986 and 
2002, the Swiss sought an official acceptance of neutrality by the collective security 
organization. Membership became a real option only if Swiss neutrality was officially or 
unofficially accepted in some form. Furthermore, the acceptance of differential neutrality 
by a majority of the public was a necessary condition for a successful referendum. 
Although neutrality was not the single decisive factor in the referendum outcomes, the 
thesis showed that membership in a collective security organization with an abandonment 
of neutrality would have been impossible.373 
                                                 
373 This seems at least to be the official consensus of the Swiss elite. Because the question was never 
asked, however, it is difficult to prove this point. 
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David Brackett wrote in 1997 that “A new neutrality policy, which could be 
accurately termed circumstantial neutrality, will allow Switzerland the latitude to 
participate internationally where it can make a difference, selecting its issues and 
international relations à la carte.”374 This statement accurately describes Swiss neutrality. 
This policy, however, was not new; it was conducted in practice since 1920, sometimes 
with more and sometimes with less flexibility. In doing so, Switzerland followed a 
foreign policy course that can largely be explained by national interests. Chapter III 
showed that the invention of differential neutrality provided the instrument and the 
rationale for such a policy in a time of collective security systems. Furthermore, the 
degree of Switzerland’s differential neutrality was approximately proportional to the 
strengths of collective security in the international system. This thesis argued that it was 
the League experience from 1920 to 1945 that convinced the Swiss of an ostensible 
paradox. On one side, neutrality could coexist with collective security; on the other side, 
neutrality guaranteed Switzerland’s independence and security more effectively than an 
imperfect collective security organization. Since then, neutrality and solidarity have been 
linked in foreign policy practice.    
Chapter IV showed how the experiences in 1938 and the impact of World War II 
reinforced the general consensus after 1946, neither to discuss the return to differential 
neutrality, nor to question the status of neutrality in official rhetoric. As a consequence, 
the gap between the public perception of neutrality and the realities of foreign policy 
gradually increased. It took four decades to reconstruct the term traditional neutrality in 
such a way that it encompassed differential neutrality. When in 2002 the public 
recognized differential neutrality again as a possible option, UN membership was 
accepted. Chapter IV showed, however, that this change of opinion was not due so much 
to the merit of the case presented by the government, as to the changed international 
security environment in the 1990s. 
One has to conclude that the Swiss did not embrace the logic of collective 
security, despite the two successful referendums in 1920 and 2002. The country 
                                                 
374 Brackett, International Relations à la Carte. 
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supported collective security efforts only if there was no other choice. As soon as the 
collective security organization showed weaknesses, or when the gap between the 
neutrality discourse and the collective security activities became too evident, the Swiss 
returned to a narrow interpretation of neutrality. 
This thesis followed the changes in the three neutrality functions—security, 
solidarity, and identity. The security function of neutrality sharply declined in the Cold 
War and even more in the 1990s. This, however, was not because of the UN, or because 
of the incompatibilities of neutrality with collective security, but rather because of the 
long peace in Europe, the successful European integration movement, and the absence of 
major interstate wars. Furthermore, there were signs that the public differentiated 
between the potential security function of neutrality and the current security function. 
Indeed, the public probably perceives neutrality as “a safety belt in the case of collective 
security failures.”375 Furthermore, one can make the argument that the Swiss, perhaps in 
contrast to the modern security establishment and the academic world, make a 
quantitative and qualitative distinction between current threats, such as terrorism, and 
existential threats, such as a possible invasion by a neighboring country. There is a little 
discussed psychological difference between declaring neutrality as “irrelevant,” or seeing 
the concept as “temporarily not necessary.”  
In sum, this study could not fully confirm the initial hypothesis that Switzerland 
joined the League and the UN at times when the security function of neutrality appeared 
to be in relative decline. It is true that the absence of a direct external threat made the 
pursuit of differential neutrality more feasible, and therefore, membership in a collective 
security organization more likely. It is; however, wrong to assume that the Swiss joined a 
collective security organization in order to compensate for decreased security provided by 
neutrality. Furthermore, the public perception of the security function of neutrality did 
not necessarily mirror the real value of neutrality as a security strategy.376 In addition, 
neutrality was perceived as a concept against interstate wars. It seems that the Swiss 
                                                 
375 Goetschel, Neutrality, a really Dead Concept?, 115. 
376 Neutrality has of course the basic problem that its ultimate success or failure can only be verified 
during times of war. 
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public is not prepared to abandon the idea that inter-state war threats could arise. 
Moreover, it does not accept new threats (such as terrorism) as equal in significance. 
These factors have to be taken into account when analyzing the modern role of the 
security function of neutrality. 
The Swiss have constantly emphasized the solidarity function of neutrality. As 
outlined in Chapter II, solidarity is an inherent part of neutrality. Its purpose is to 
convince the international community of the sincerity of the commitment to neutrality. It 
compensates for the moral deficiencies of neutrality, and it strengthens the rule of law in 
the international realm. The missionary belief in the country’s role as an international 
example was another reason for the constant high public support for the solidarity 
function. The link between neutrality and national identity prevented political attempts to 
challenge this belief. This thesis argued that Switzerland joined the League and the UN to 
express solidarity and thereby strengthen its neutrality and position in the international 
system. Chapters III and IV outlined the major Swiss efforts to escape international 
isolation by expressing solidarity in multilateral and bilateral forums. The abstinence 
from the UN, however, was the best evidence that the strategy was not “solidarity or 
neutrality” but “solidarity with neutrality.” The Swiss refused to join the UN as long as 
they believed that the organization would not accept this idea. Nevertheless, solidarity 
was expressed in different forms and the country became a major UN contributor. In 
addition, this study proposes that the provision of good offices is too narrow a definition 
of the solidarity function. Solidarity as a part of neutrality should be seen in a broader 
context. In sum, solidarity is linked to neutrality in theory and practice. Even if it is true 
that solidarity compensated for the decline of the security function of neutrality, this 
thesis showed that one needs to be careful to interpret these Swiss efforts as a genuine 
sign of support for the solidarity principle of a collective security organization. 
The national identity function of Swiss neutrality was the most challenging one to 
analyze. It was evident that neutrality played a major role for Swiss national identity and 
was intertwined with the other identity pillars—independence, direct democracy, and 
federalism. This study showed that the national identity function massively influenced the 
public neutrality discourse, and furthermore, that the domestic discussion was often 
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disconnected from neutrality policy in practice. Most authors claimed that the national 
identity function of neutrality originated in World War II. The concept became ingrained 
in Swiss minds due to the totemic role of neutrality in domestic rhetoric during the Cold 
War. Chapter III provided some evidence, however, that the neutrality discourse in the 
interwar period was not that different from the post-World War II debate. Neutrality was 
always seen as something more than just a simple security policy instrument. In any case, 
whether the national identity function was called as such or whether this function was 
publicly highly supported or not, the outcome was similar. The national identity function 
prevented neutrality from being neglected or abandoned. Indeed, it increased the 
influence of domestic politics in foreign policy, and it allowed the temporal disconnection 
of the neutrality discourse from international reality. However, the national identity 
function did not necessarily prevent Switzerland from joining a collective security 
organization. The strong influence of national identity aspects on Swiss policy makes 
questionable the underlying hope of certain observers that Switzerland will become a 
“normal” state in Europe, once neutrality is reduced to its technical security policy core 
and thereby becomes insignificant in theory and practice. 
B. SWISS NEUTRALITY, TODAY AND TOMORROW 
Neutrality and collective security are complementary concepts; the more 
there is of the one, the less there is of the other.  
—Hersch Lauterpacht, 1936377 
Lauterpacht’s statement was the basic assumption of this work. In contrast to 
other writers, this thesis investigated the hypothesis that neutrality is not dead because 
collective security is far from being operational in the Wilsonian sense. From a wider 
historical perspective, the ambivalent relationship between neutrality and the collective 
security organizations of the twentieth century is only a symptom of a larger evolution of 
the international system. Neutrality was born out of the decline of the Holy Roman 
Empire and the new imperative of the sovereign national state after the Peace of 
Westphalia amid the rise of the five great powers in Europe. Therefore, only the end of 
                                                 
377 Lauterpacht quoted in Morgenthau, The Resurrection of Neutrality in Europe, 478. 
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this state sovereignty will finally remove neutrality from the landscape. Thus, neutrality 
remains a possible strategy for small states in Europe as long as there is not a new 
empire, or a United States of Europe, or a powerful collective security organization that 
holds the global monopoly of legitimate violence, or finally, world peace. 
This conclusion ends by providing some thoughts about the current status of 
Swiss neutrality, taking into account developments since 2002. Furthermore, it outlines 
the influencing factors for future collective security referendums. Finally, it offers some 
ideas for further work on Swiss neutrality and collective security. 
It seems that since 2002 the Swiss have reacted traditionally to the long-standing 
reality of unilaterally declared wars, a further weakening of the UN, a decline in respect 
for international law, a decreased value of state sovereignty, a world financial crisis, and 
an increased external pressure of the great powers on Switzerland. There are clear signals 
from the public that sovereignty, independence, and neutrality are highly valued and that 
in times of crisis the population searches for mental stability in the traditional past. The 
consequences are an isolationistic tendency and a revival of traditional neutrality policy. 
The basic struggle between domestic neutrality rhetoric and foreign policy practice 
continues. The current understanding of neutrality, in the form of differential neutrality, is 
bound to relative peace. Swiss solidarity with collective security will decrease as soon as 
there is again a need for the security function of neutrality. While collective security is 
now compatible with neutrality, collective defense is not. There is no way to overcome 
this dilemma, and there is little hope that the political elite will initiate the deconstruction 
of neutrality in the future. Therefore, the Swiss government is once again challenged to 
find a way out of this isolation. Only the future will tell if the end of this process will be 
comparable to post-World War II, or to the 1930s, or not comparable at all.  
In addition, there are recent claims that Switzerland is overstrained with the fast 
changing international environment and the massive external pressure especially in the 
realms of economics and society. One may challenge this assumption, but it is true that 
historically the country has not received external pressure well, and always defined itself 
against the risk of external pressure. Today, the major external factor for Switzerland is 
not the United States or the United Nations; it is the European Union. If the European 
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Union wishes to incorporate Switzerland, or to impose its norms upon the country, it 
better not do it with the methods of a great power or an empire. The EU would, thereby, 
put Swiss domestic stability at risk. In 1815, the great powers realized that this would not 
be in the interest of Europe. In this sense, for the freedom and benefit of all, and once 
more in history, Switzerland has to be granted some sort of special status. 
Although it is difficult to generalize about Swiss collective security referendums, 
this study concluded that several preconditions support a positive outcome. First, only 
fundamental and highly visible changes in the international environment mobilize Swiss 
citizens, and provide the leverage for major changes in foreign policy. Second, only a 
united Swiss elite and strong governmental leadership can successfully exploit such an 
historic window of opportunity. Third, a direct attack on neutrality, or a negation of its 
role for national identity, or an attempt to undermine neutrality in favor of solidarity, is a 
recipe for failure. Rational discussion about the compatibility of neutrality with collective 
security ignores the national identity function of the concept, and furthermore, ignores the 
fact that neutrality can still serve as a flexible instrument in international relations. 
Fourth, it remains unclear and questionable whether massive external pressure, 
immediate security threats, or an economic decline would have the potential to trigger 
public opinion in favor of collective security or a military alliance. 
This thesis could not address in detail several factors that are relevant for a deeper 
understanding of Swiss neutrality, Swiss foreign policy, the interactions between external 
and internal factors, and the outcomes of referendums. First, the EU increasingly acts as a 
unique type of collective security organization. It is no coincidence that the Swiss 
neutrality debate shifted recently from the UN to the EU. In addition to the League and 
the UN, a similar analysis of the case of the EU would be helpful. Second, this study 
showed that the national identity role of neutrality was difficult to quantify in magnitude 
and over time. A better understanding of the concept of national identity and the 
relationships among independence, federalism, direct democracy and neutrality would be 
important in order to justify or explain the variable ranking of these four pillars and the 
relative decline of neutrality at certain historical junctures. Third, this work probably did 
not place enough emphasis on the influence of economic factors. While the economic 
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aspects of neutrality and the dilemmas associated with sanctions are well known, there is 
a lack of understanding about the degree to which people are willing to sacrifice 
economic prosperity in exchange for independence, sovereignty, and neutrality. Finally, 
explanations of how external and internal factors affect public opinion, especially during 
referendums, are still insufficient. In this context, a study about the relationships among 
external objective threats to a country, the threats perceived by the people, and the rise or 
decline of the security function of neutrality could offer valuable insights. These are some 
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